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Historical Debates and Territorial Claims

Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute

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Introduction: The Russian Challenge

The dissolution of the USSR—the last world empire—brought to the fore the whole range of problems that usually accompanies the dissolution of empires. The disintegration of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and, to some extent, French empires took place in the midst of war. Despite the fact that Britain and later Portugal withdrew from their colonial territories almost peacefully, the national, tribal, and religious conflicts that commenced after the departure of colonial administrations eventually resulted in bloody conflicts and wars.

Among the many problems that have followed from the dissolution of the USSR is the border question. Although the border disputes in the former USSR have not been as sharp as they are in the former Yugoslavia, they do constitute a serious threat to peaceful relations between the former Soviet republics. It was hardly accidental that the first major manifestation of national unrest in the USSR came with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region claimed by two former Soviet republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The five-year war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for control over Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates how dangerous the border conflicts in the former USSR can be. The

transformation of administrative borders into state borders is proving to be a very complicated and uneasy process.¹

With the disintegration of the USSR, the border question has raised to the level of special importance the relations between two other republics of the former Soviet Union—Russia and Ukraine. The problem came to light in late August 1991, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. On 29 August the spokesman for the Russian president, Pavel Voshchanov, announced that if Ukraine seceded from the USSR, Russia would reserve the right to revise its borders with Ukraine.² In fact, the new Russian authorities claimed Russia's right to the eastern and southern oblasts of Ukraine, areas that underwent a high degree of Russification under the Communist regime, and to the Crimean Peninsula, a region transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954.

Since the results of the Ukrainian referendum (held in December 1991) demonstrated overwhelming support for the idea of Ukrainian independence (more than 90 percent of the voters that took part in the referendum voted for independence), the nationalistic faction in the Russian leadership was forced to abandon previous Russian claims to the eastern Ukrainian oblasts and concentrate specifically on the issue of Crimea, the only region in Ukraine where ethnic Russians constitute the majority of the population and where the vote for independence was the lowest in Ukraine (54 percent in favor). As the "all-Union resort" and home of the Black Sea fleet, Crimea is viewed by many Russian politicians as an "ancient Russian territory." Leaders of the parliamentary nationalistic factions have been using every single opportunity to publicize their opinion that the transition of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was conducted in violation of the Russian constitution and that there are more than enough legal arguments in place to demand the transfer of Crimea back to Russia.³

In April 1992, when the confrontation over Crimea had reached its peak, Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi on his visit to Crimea made a direct claim to that territory, justifying this claim on the basis of historical arguments. Rutskoi rejected one part of Crimean history—the transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954—and emphasized another—the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire and its military presence there:

If one turns to history, then again history is not on the side of those who are trying to appropriate this land. If in 1954, perhaps under the influ-

ence of a hangover or maybe of sunstroke, the appropriate documents were signed according to which the Crimea was transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, I am sorry, such a document does not cancel out the history of Crimea.⁴

In another remark made by Rutskoï during his April 1992 visit to Crimea, he asserted that the Black Sea fleet was and would remain Russian.⁵ This same position was shared by the commander of the fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, who in December 1992 stressed in an interview with the Russian nationalist newspaper *Literaturnaia Rossiia* that Russia in any form cannot be imagined without its glorious Black Sea fleet. According to Kasatonov, the Ukrainian takeover of the Black Sea fleet and its naval bases in Crimea and the Black Sea region would throw Russia back three centuries, to the times before the rule of Peter I.⁶

For Rutskoï, Kasatonov, and other nationalistically oriented Russian leaders, the history of the Russian presence in Crimea is closely connected to the history of the fleet and hence to the history of its main base in Crimea—Sevastopol. The myth of Sevastopol as a “city of Russian glory” has been used often as a cornerstone in the historical justification for all current Russian territorial claims to Crimea.⁷ This myth is based on the events of the Crimean War of 1853–56 and presents the heroism of the multinational imperial army at the siege exclusively as the heroism of the Russian soldiers. It was used to justify and protect the imperial aggrandizements of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and received its second life under the Stalinist regime, especially during World War II and later in the circumstances of the Cold War.⁸ With the disintegration of the USSR and rebirth of the Russian imperial ideology, this myth, like other imperial myths that survive from the Soviet period, was once again invoked to preserve Russian interests beyond the state territory of the Russian Federation. It was in the tradition of Sevastopol mythology that Admiral Kasatonov was really proud to say in his interview with *Literaturnaia Rossiia* that during his tenure as a commander of the fleet, the tomb of Admirals Lazarev, Nakhimov, Kornilov, and Istomin, who were killed during the Sevastopol siege of 1854–55, was restored in the St. Volodymyr Cathedral of Sevastopol.⁹

The exploitation of the Sevastopol myth by leading Russian politicians and military commanders in their territorial claims to Ukraine

pressed the Ukrainian side to fight back with the same weapon—historical arguments and justifications. Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk in his interview with Sevastopol TV in January 1993 proposed to solve the Sevastopol question peacefully, by not questioning whose glory is symbolized by the city of Sevastopol, “because otherwise,” he said, “it would be possible to return to the times of Alexander of Macedonia and Julius Caesar.” And he continued, “Why do we limit ourselves to the hundred-year period. Could we not take under consideration a thousand years? Really, there are no limits. One person might like to start with the 1920s, and another with the 1940s.”¹⁰ Thus he tried to question not the history of the Russian presence in the region, but first of all the legitimacy of the claims made on the basis of a relatively short period in the history of the peninsula, when in fact its history is much longer and includes the years of Greek colonization. To counter the Russian position, Ukrainian historians and politicians chose to base their policy of preserving their country’s territorial integrity on the basis of a highly elaborate Cossack mythology.

One of the main differences between East and West European nationalism is often viewed in their attitudes toward the past. As Hans Kohn put it:

Nationalism in the West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past; nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe created often, out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political reality.¹¹

From the historiographical point of view, Ukrainian nationalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries based the idea of an independent Ukrainian state on two main myths: that of Ukraine as the direct and only successor to medieval Kievan Rus’, and the myth of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, the first president of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918 and, like many other leaders of the national awakening in Eastern Europe, a prominent historian, contributed much to the development of both myths. It was his initiative to adopt the trident—the symbol of power of the medieval Kievan princes—as the national coat of arms. It was also Hrushevs’kyi who

could be considered the most prominent twentieth-century student of the Cossack era.¹²

This chapter takes as its point of departure John A. Armstrong's definition of the myth as *the integrating phenomenon through which symbols of national identity acquire a coherent meaning*.¹³ The author also shares his approach to the study of the myths, based on Claude Levi-Strauss's method. "I am utterly incompetent to judge whether the version of Kiev and its successors that Hrushevsky presented is 'truer' than other versions," argued Armstrong in his discussion of Ukrainian historical mythology. "The basic insight provided by the anthropological approach is that such questions are irrelevant for identity except insofar as they affect a constitutive myth."¹⁴

Thus the main goal of this chapter is not to define whether the Cossack myth is "true" or "false," but to determine how the myth was created and how it has been transformed in order to meet the challenges of the current Russian-Ukrainian border dispute. In the conclusion I will also attempt to provide an answer to the question of the possible consequences of foreign-policy decisions that are based on the grounds of historical mythology.

Cossack Mythology I: Ukrainian Cossacks and the History of the Russian Imperial Border

Cossack mythology, which was based on the accounts of the most glorious pages of Cossack history and the Cossack struggle against Poland, Turkey, the Tatars, and Russia, became an important part of the ideology of Ukrainian national awakening in the nineteenth century. The leaders of the movement were searching for examples of their glorious national past, and for the periods of independent or semi-independent existence of their nation. It was hardly a surprise that the history of Cossack uprisings and the polity created by Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi in the middle of the seventeenth century were chosen by them as a basis for a new national mythology.¹⁵

It is generally accepted that the Cossack period covers the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in Ukrainian history. In fact, the first accounts of the activity of the Ukrainian Cossacks come from the last decade of the fifteenth century, but only a century later could the Cossacks emerge as a significant military and to some extent political force. As a social group the Cossacks came into existence following a colonization

wave of the local Ukrainian population eastward to the steppe territories of southern Ukraine. The majority of them were fugitive peasants looking for new lands to cultivate and trying to avoid the serfdom imposed on them by the Polish and local Ukrainian nobility. Relatively soon the Cossacks found themselves in a position strong enough to oppose the politics of the Polish state in the frontier area. A series of Cossack uprisings against Polish rule started at the end of the sixteenth century and culminated in 1648 with the Cossack revolt led by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. The latter managed to create a separate Cossack polity—the hetmanate. For a short time this polity enjoyed an independent status, but in 1654, unable to resist a Polish offensive on its own, Khmel'nyts'ky recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar.¹⁶ The hetmanate became an autonomous part of the Muscovite state, and its eastern borders, based on the eastern borders of the Kiev and Chernihiv palatinates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, were at that time transformed into the first Russian-Ukrainian boundary. The origin of this boundary goes back to the turn of the sixteenth century. In 1503, during a war between Muscovy and Lithuania, the Chernihiv princes shifted their loyalty from Lithuania to Muscovy, and the Chernihiv territory was incorporated into the Muscovite state. It was lost by Muscovy to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Owing to the Deulino peace of 1618, the Chernihiv area was transferred to Poland.¹⁷

In the 1620s and 1630s, after a range of unsuccessful uprisings against Polish rule, the Ukrainian Cossacks started emigrating to the territory belonging to Muscovy. They were allowed by the tsar to settle in the unpopulated areas of the Donets River basin and there established block settlements in what later would be called Sloboda Ukraine, an area that today constitutes one of the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands.¹⁸

Muscovy's drive to the west and its incorporation of the Ukrainian territories began on a large scale after the conclusion of the Pereiaslav treaty in 1654. The years of the Russo-Ukrainian-Polish war that followed the Pereiaslav Agreement established a new international order in Eastern Europe. Due to the Andrusovo 1667 peace treaty, Ukrainian territories were now divided between Russia and Poland. The Dnieper river was chosen as the major delimitation line. Left-bank Ukraine came under the tsar's rule, and the existence of an autonomous Cossack polity—the hetmanate—was allowed there. Right-bank and

western Ukraine remained under Polish control. In the Polish zone, the autonomous rights of the Cossack formations were significantly diminished at first and then completely abolished. The same process was under way in Russian Ukraine. The Cossack uprising, led by Hetman Ivan Mazepa in 1708, tried to stop the process of the hetmanate's decay with the help of Sweden. Mazepa and his ally Charles XII of Sweden were defeated by the Russian tsar, Peter I, in the battle of Poltava in 1709, which resulted in a further limitation of the hetmanate's autonomous rights. The Russian-Polish border along the Dnieper continued to exist for more than a century, and remnants of this border may be seen in some parts of the contemporary Ukrainian-Belarusian border in the Chernihiv area.¹⁹

The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed the extension of Russian imperial territory further to the west and south. The victorious wars of the empire with Turkey resulted in the annexation of the vast areas along the coast of the Azov and Black seas and finally in the annexation of Crimea in 1783.²⁰ Three subsequent partitions of Poland in 1772–95 brought under the tsar's rule the majority of Ukrainian ethnic territories: right-bank Ukraine, Volhynia, Podillia, the Kholm region, and Pidliassia.²¹

The Ukrainian Cossacks played an important role in the acquisition of the new territories, especially those areas that were annexed as a result of the Russo-Turkish wars. The Ukrainian elite, who collaborated with the imperial government, demonstrated their special support for Russian actions against their traditional enemies: the Tatars, Turks, and Poles. A principal architect of Russian foreign policy in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was Prince Oleksandr Bezborod'ko, a descendant of the well-known Ukrainian family and initially a Cossack officer himself, who was especially anxious to annex to the Russian Empire the new territories in western and southern Ukraine that once belonged to Poland and Turkey.²²

The Russo-Turkish wars of the second half of the eighteenth century resulted not only in the expansion of Ukrainian territory under the rule of the Russian Tsars but also in the abolition of autonomous Cossack bodies in Ukraine. By the 1770s both the hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich, the Cossack Host in the lower Dnieper region, ceased to exist as a result of actions taken by Empress Catherine II. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were resettled partly in the territories along the coast of the Azov and Black seas, the territories that they had helped attach to the

empire, and partly in the Kuban region (now a territory in the Russian Federation) and the trans-Danube territory (now part of Romania). The new territorial acquisitions of the empire opened the way for Ukrainian peasants to emigrate from densely populated areas of left- and right-bank Ukraine to southern and eastern Ukraine, and to the Voronezh, Don, Kuban, and Stavropol regions now in Russia. This resettlement of the Ukrainian population, which started in the seventeenth century, lasted until the beginning of the twentieth and defined the boundaries of Ukrainian ethnic territory in the east.²³

Cossack Mythology II: Formation of the Myth

Despite the initial spread of Cossack formations over the vast territories of left-bank and right-bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podillia, the origin of the Cossack mythology has been linked to the relatively small part of Ukrainian territory once controlled by the Cossacks—the territory of the hetmanate. It was the only Cossack area that enjoyed the elements of autonomy for a relatively long period of time and where maintaining the historical memory of the Cossacks was essential for the survival of the ruling elite.

There is enough evidence in place to state that the process of the creation of certain elements of the Cossack mythology began as early as the first decades of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, till the turn of the eighteenth century there was a lack of “bearers of the high culture” closely associated with Cossacks to create any sort of elaborated mythology. The process began on a large scale only in the first decades of the eighteenth century. This period witnessed the emergence in the hetmanate of the new social strata composed of a mixture of Cossack officers and old nobility, defined by Zenon Kohut as the Ukrainian gentry.²⁴ This gentry strived for the preservation of the autonomous rights for its political entity and attempted to build the concept of the hetmanate’s legitimacy on the legacy of Cossack treaties with the tsars, creating in that way one of the first stages in the development of Cossack mythology. In fact, the myth was shaped in such a way to support the power of the emerging gentry. The gentry needed the Cossack myth to secure not only the political rights of the hetmanate, but also its own economic rights based on the Cossack-Muscovite treaties of the second half of the seventeenth century.²⁵

The defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the battle of Poltava in 1709

constituted in many ways the turning point in the development of Cossack mythology. Threatened by Peter I, the gentry mobilized in defense of the rights of the Cossack *starshyna* gained from the tsar by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. It was in the atmosphere of the Poltava defeat that the Cossack chronicles of Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samiilo Velychko were written and the cult of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi reemerged and gained its new characteristics, which developed later into one of the main cults of Ukrainian national ideology.²⁶

The next wave of commemorating and recalling the Cossack heroic past came in the second half of the eighteenth century. This was the period when the gentry undertook its last attempt to avoid the abolition of the hetmanate and found itself involved more than ever in a struggle for official recognition of its noble rights by the imperial authorities. In both cases the historical arguments were considered extremely important, and a range of historical works recalling the glorious Cossack past were written at this time, beginning with the book of Petro Symonovs'ky and ending with the anonymous *Istoriia Rusov*.²⁷

It was the gentry of the hetmanate—the ruling elite of a comparatively small part of contemporary Ukrainian territory—who created the Cossack myth as a reflection of their own political necessity and historical belief, and it was necessary for a new generation of Ukrainian patriots to come into the political arena in order to transfer the Cossack myth from the rank of local historical mythology to the rank of nationwide ideology that would bring together the most remote parts of Ukrainian ethnic territory. This work was done by the nationalists of the nineteenth century.

The most prominent role in the development and popularization of Cossack mythology belongs to the apostle of the nineteenth century Ukrainian national revival, the poet and artist Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861).²⁸ His views on the Cossack past were based primarily on two main sources: Cossack mythology elaborated by the hetmanate elite and popularized by the early nineteenth-century political work *Istoriia Rusov*, and, in addition, popular memory. The outstanding event in Cossack history that was remembered by the simple peasants in right-bank Ukraine—Shevchenko's homeland—was the *Koliivshchyna*, the popular uprising against Polish rule in 1768–69, led by the Cossack officers Ivan Honta and Maksym Zalizniak. This revolt was launched under the slogan of the protection of Orthodoxy against a Uniate offensive. Shevchenko also brought into his poems the popular

memory of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host in the lower Dnieper, generally viewed without any heroization by the authors of the hetmanate, and popularized by Nikolai Gogol in his novel *Taras Bulba*. Despite the fact that Shevchenko challenged the Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi myth on the grounds of the hetman's pro-Russian policy, he managed to combine in his poems the historical experience and views on the Cossack past of two generally hostile social strata—landlords and peasantry—and presented this unified vision in his historical verses and poems first published in the 1841 edition of the *Kobzar*, the bible of the Ukrainian national revival.

There is no doubt that for this new type of Cossack mythology, created and popularized by Shevchenko's poetry, it was much easier to win the hearts of readers in the central and southern regions of Ukraine, where popular memory of the Cossacks was still alive, than to find its way to the western regions of Ukraine, where the Cossack experience was but a short-lived phenomenon of the seventeenth century. At the same time, Shevchenko's poetry was a much better vehicle for propagating the new Cossack mythology than the writings of the hetmanate elite. Unlike *Istoriia Rusov*, which was written in the highly Russified, bookish language of the late eighteenth–early nineteenth century, read and understood only in Russian Ukraine, Shevchenko's poems were written in vernacular Ukrainian. This opened the way for the spread of his writings, and with them Cossack mythology, to the ethnic Ukrainian territories under Austro-Hungarian rule.

Especially important for the fate of the Ukrainian national movement was the case of Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²⁹ The path of Cossack mythology to Galicia was not easy, due to a combination of different political, confessional, and historical reasons. There was never any Cossack organization in Galicia, despite the fact that many of its natives, such as the seventeenth-century Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi, took part in the Cossack movement in Dnieper Ukraine. Presenting Galicians as active participants of the Cossack movement was the only possible approach that could provide a logical link between the Galician national revival and the Cossack past. Special sub-myths and family legends were created in Galicia to bring the Cossack past closer to its population—a theory of the migration of people from Galicia to Dnieper Ukraine and then from the lower Dnieper region back to Galicia was developed and popularized among the Galician intelligentsia.

This situation was complicated not only by the fact that the Cossack system never existed in Galicia but also by the pro-Orthodox and very often anti-Uniate character of the Cossack mythology. To accept Cossack mythology in its full shape with all its anti-Uniate pathos was not an easy task for the Ukrainian movement in Uniate Galicia. So the myth was modified, reshaped, and adapted to local circumstances. In a very short time, due to the spread of Shevchenko's cult and the activity of the *narodovtsi* (populists), Galician Ukrainians became more zealous adherents of the Cossack mythology than their eastern Ukrainian counterparts.

The triumph of Cossack mythology as the unifying factor of the Ukrainian national revival came with the events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–20. The “Sich riflemen” detachments, named after the tradition of the Host of the Zaporozhian Cossacks (Sich), were formed in Galicia during World War I and later played an important role in the struggle for Ukrainian independence both in western and eastern Ukraine. In 1918 eastern Ukraine, occupied by German forces after the Brest-Litovsk treaty, witnessed the rule of Hetman Pavlo Skoropad'skyi, imposed under the slogan of the restoration of the hetmanate traditions. The armed forces of the Directory, the next Ukrainian government, which took over from Skoropad'skyi after the withdrawal of German troops, were also built according to the preservation of Cossack tradition. Even the Bolshevik army that fought for the control of Ukrainian territory with Ukrainian forces claimed to be the successor to the Cossack tradition—special units of “Red Cossacks” were formed as an integral part of the Red Army.³⁰

When the Bolsheviks took over eastern and central Ukraine, they initially tolerated the Ukrainian national and cultural revival, but then crushed it in the first half of the 1930s. The Cossack mythology was restructured by Soviet historians to meet the demands of vulgar Marxism and growing Russian nationalism. Only those Ukrainian hetmans who served Russia were tolerated in the new textbooks of Ukrainian history. Cossacks were replaced as the main heroes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by peasants, who were not connected to the tradition of Ukrainian nation building and therefore did not present any threat to the communist rulers.³¹

“Independent” Cossack mythology survived only in western Ukraine—in Galicia and Volhynia—the two regions that were under Polish occupation from 1920 to 1939. When in 1943–44 Soviet troops

entered western Ukraine to fight the German army, official Soviet propaganda was forced to take into account the national aspirations of the local Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian government started to present itself as an independent one, groups of Soviet armed forces (fronts) that fought in Ukraine were renamed “Ukrainian fronts,” and finally a special military award, named after the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, was introduced in the autumn of 1943 by the Soviet authorities.³² It was only a temporary suspension of official Soviet ideology. After the war most expressions of Ukrainian national ideology that were tolerated during the war were officially banned.

Cossack mythology, revived in Ukraine after Stalin’s death, reached its highest point in the 1960s but was banned again in 1972. At that time, Petro Shelest, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was accused of the “idealization of the past” and replaced by his rival Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi. The purge of “Cossackophiles” had begun in the institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the universities, and many of the academics who specialized in Ukrainian history and the literature of the Cossack era were removed from their positions or forced to shift to the study of other topics unconnected with the officially condemned Cossack past.³³ Despite the persecution of Cossack studies, Cossack mythology appeared to be deeply rooted in the historical consciousness of western Ukraine, which was “sovietized” only in the late 1940s, and reemerged there with the beginning of perestroika and glasnost.

Cossack Mythology III: Territorial Integrity and Territorial Claims

In the spring of 1990 in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Nikopil, in an area where the majority of Zaporozhian Hosts were established, the local branch of the Ukrainian Republican Party—one of the most anti-Communist organizations at that time—endorsed the idea of a local student of Cossack history, Pavlo Bohush, to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The initiative for this extensive ideological campaign, named “March to the East,” came from the Dnieper region, but was actively supported and realized by the national democratic organizations of Galicia that came to power after the first relatively free elections in the USSR. They considered the Cossack myth their main weapon in the political fight for eastern

Ukraine. Thousands of people from all parts of Ukraine, but especially from Galicia, travelled in summer 1990 to the lower Dnieper region to take part in these festivities.³⁴

One of the ironies of history was the fact that Galicians, people that had no direct links to the Cossack past, were bringing the Cossack myth back to eastern Ukraine, the homeland of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The CPSU functionaries in eastern Ukraine tried to fight back, challenging the Galicians' right to the Cossack heritage and exploiting the anti-Uniate motives of nineteenth-century Cossack mythology. For example, in Dnipropetrovs'k oblast they did not want to allow Greek-Catholic (Uniate) priests to serve a liturgy on the grave of the Cossack ataman Ivan Sirko.³⁵ But all these attempts to split the movement and to isolate the Galician participants of the march from the local population had little, if any, effect. The government officials were pressed to join the 1990 Cossack festivities, and in 1991, in order to take control of the Cossackophile movement, they organized conferences and festivities of their own to mark the Cossack anniversary. The official celebrations took place in the lower Dnieper region: Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, Nikopil; and in Volhynia—near Berestechko, on the site of the 1651 Cossack battle with the Poles.³⁶

The rise of Ukrainian national aspirations in 1990–91 and the massive offensive of national democratic forces from Galicia to the east provoked some Russian separatist initiatives on the part of the Communist elite of the eastern and southern oblasts of Ukraine. These separatist moves were also based on historical arguments. They attempted to prove that eastern and southern Ukraine were never a part of ethnic Ukrainian territory but were colonized and settled by Russians. Similar ideas were expressed around the same time by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who, in a highly publicized article in the former USSR titled, "How Shall We Reconstitute Russia," claimed that New Russia, Crimea, and Donbass "were never part of old Ukraine."³⁷ The term "New Russia" once referred to the territory of the southern Ukrainian oblasts and was introduced for the first time in the second half of the eighteenth century. Despite the fact that the term used for the territory included the lands of Zaporozhian Cossacks, colonized by them long before the first appearance of the imperial authorities in this region, the idea of establishing New Russia as a Russian polity in southern Ukraine was put forward by some scholars and historians, including the Odessa professor A. Surilov. Around the same time the

idea of restoring the Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih and Crimea republics, once proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in 1918 to stop the German seizure of the territory after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, was put forward in some eastern and southern Ukrainian newspapers.³⁸ These attempts were a direct challenge to the Cossack mythology, used by the national democrats to accelerate the process of Ukrainian national awakening in this region.

The adherents of Cossack mythology accepted the challenge, and a dozen articles appeared in the national and local press trying to adjust Cossack mythology to the new political demands. Since the territory of Zaporozhian Sich even at its apogee did not cover the whole territory of Ukraine's eastern and southern oblasts, the Cossack myth had to be modified. To provide historical justification for Ukraine's right to these territories, Cossack mythology was forced to challenge Russian imperial mythology on one hand and its own anti-Tatar character on the other.

New emphasis was placed by Ukrainian historians on the role of Cossack detachments in the history of the Russo-Turkish wars of the second half of the eighteenth century. It was emphasized in numerous publications of 1990–91 that it was not so much the imperial army as the Ukrainian Cossacks who conquered and colonized Ukrainian territories during the Russo-Turkish wars. This was true in part, especially in the case of colonization, because otherwise Ukrainians would never have constituted the majority of the region's population, but in the case of military history it was an exaggeration of the Cossack role in these military actions and a diminishing of the role played by the well-trained Russian imperial army. Ukrainian authors wrote about the participation of Cossack detachments in Russian attacks on the Turkish fortresses of Ochakiv, Izmail, and Akkerman and their takeover of other forts—Berezan and Khajibei. On the site of the latter, the Cossacks and their families were the first inhabitants of the newly founded city of Odessa.³⁹ Some articles attempted to challenge even the “cornerstone” of the Russian imperial ideology—the Sevastopol myth. The historian of the Ukrainian navy, V. Kravtsevych, citing an eighteenth-century description of Sevastopol, claimed that the “city of Russian glory” was built by Cossacks and local Ukrainian peasants and that in the first decades of its existence Sevastopol looked like a typical Ukrainian settlement.⁴⁰

Another modification of Cossack mythology was connected with

the reexamination of the history of Cossack-Tatar relations. The Cossack was usually viewed by the creators of Ukrainian national mythology as a defender of his homeland—Ukraine—from Turkish and Tatar attacks. Accordingly, Tatars were treated in this context as the worst enemies of Ukraine. During the 1950s and 1960s, in official Soviet historiography, Tatars were usually portrayed as the main adversaries of the Ukrainian Cossacks. It was almost prohibited at that time to study the Cossack conflicts with Russia or to pay special attention to Cossack-Polish conflicts. Socialist Poland was a close ally of the USSR, and one could hardly find any remarks about Cossack-Polish conflicts or Ukrainian-Polish wars. Instead the formula of “peasant-Cossack uprisings against the *shliakhta* and magnates” was used by official Soviet historiography. At the same time the official historians did speak about “Tatar attacks” on Ukrainian lands.⁴¹

This new approach to the Tatar problem was introduced in the 1960s by the representatives of the Ukrainian democratic movement. The role of General Petro Hryhorenko (Petr Grigorenko) in the defense of the rights of the Crimean Tatars is well known in the West, but Hryhorenko was not alone in his attempts to “rehabilitate” the Tatars. In 1968 the well-known Ukrainian writer Roman Ivanychuk published a novel titled *Mal’vy (Mallow)*, in which he attempted to reexamine the history of the decline of the empires and the role of the national traitors—the janisaries. Actually, he also presented a new approach to the dramatic history of Ukrainian-Tatar relations in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. The novel was severely criticized, banned, and confiscated from bookstores and libraries.⁴²

Ukrainian historians renewed their attempts to reexamine the history of Cossack-Tatar relations with the beginning of glasnost. This initiative was launched by publications of scholars from Dnipropetrovs’k University in southern Ukraine—the only center of Cossack studies in Ukraine that survived the period of persecution of Ukrainian historiography in the 1970s and 1980s. In his articles on the history of the Cossack army, the Dnipropetrovs’k historian Ivan Storozhenko pictured the Tatar troops of *Murza* Tuhaj Bej, the ally of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, in predominantly positive terms, and Storozhenko’s colleague, Iurii Mytsyk, whose main works have also been devoted to Cossack history, published a series of articles on Tatar history in a Crimean Tatar newspaper.⁴³ In some other Ukrainian publications of this period the history of Cossack-Tatar collaboration in the struggle

against Russia and Turkey received special attention.⁴⁴ It has also been stressed that in the seventeenth century the majority of Crimea's population was not Tatar but Ukrainian people, captured by the Tatars during their attacks on Ukrainian territories. Contemporary data stated that there were 920,000 Cossacks (Ukrainians) and 180,000 Tatars in Crimea in the middle of the seventeenth century. This information was drawn from the memoirs of a Turkish traveler, Evlia Chelebi, who visited Crimea in 1666.⁴⁵

These and other attempts to reexamine the history of Cossack-Tatar relations to a certain extent present an effort to modify Cossack mythology in such a way as to meet the new demands for the creation of a Ukrainian-Tatar political union in the fight against Russian claims to the peninsula. For this reason, the Cossack myth has been dropping its original anti-imperialist character and giving up some features of its ethnic exclusivity to meet the goal of building a multinational civic society and preserving Ukraine's territorial integrity.

In Ukraine, the Cossack legacy is also viewed as an important instrument in the legitimization of the Ukrainian claims to the USSR Black Sea fleet. Proponents of Ukrainian national ideology usually begin the history of the Ukrainian navy with the period of the Kievan princes Askold, Dir, Oleh, and Ihor, who on a number of occasions in the ninth and tenth centuries attacked Constantinople from the sea, but most attention is usually devoted to the history of Cossack activity in the Black Sea region. Contemporary organizations of the Ukrainian Cossacks have established close links with the newly born Ukrainian navy and its commander, Admiral Borys Kozhyn. He has promised that the first anniversary of the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet will be celebrated on the Dnieper island of Khortytsia—the legendary homeland of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁴⁶

Ironically, Cossack mythology has had fewer problems claiming some Ukrainian territories beyond the country's state borders than securing the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. Among the territories settled by the Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the Kuban peninsula and the southern regions of the Kursk and Voronezh oblasts of the Russian Federation, and some trans-Dniester and trans-Danube areas, now parts of Moldova and Romania. The Kuban region is separated from Crimea by the Kerch Strait and initially was settled by the former Zaporozhian Cossacks in the 1790s. Later, more Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants, together with Don Cos-

sacks and Russian peasantry, moved into the area. During the years of the revolution there was a strong pro-Ukrainian movement in Kuban, and the local government negotiated with Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi on the conditions of a Ukrainian-Kuban federative treaty. After the revolution, Kuban was included in the Russian Federation. In 1926, 47.1 percent of the region's population considered themselves Ukrainian and 41 percent Russian. Ukrainian national schools, newspapers, and even a Ukrainian department in the local university existed for a short period, but a policy of Russification of the Ukrainian population was launched by the Communist authorities in the 1930s, and with the introduction of a passport system, all residents of Kuban were declared to be Russian.⁴⁷

The Kuban Cossack organizations like those of the Don and Stavropol regions were reestablished in 1990 with some support from the local authorities, who wanted to use Cossacks to counter the growing political activity of non-Slavic peoples in the Northern Caucasus and to fight crime. With the proclamation of Ukrainian independence there emerged a strong pro-Ukrainian sentiment among the Cossack leadership of the Kuban region—a development that was not welcomed by the local authorities. Unlike their Don colleagues, the Kuban Cossacks developed close links with Cossack organizations in Ukraine. It is quite characteristic that when in March 1993 one of the leaders of the Kuban Cossacks, Ievhen Nahai, was arrested by local authorities in Kuban on the charges of preparing a Cossack coup, the other high-ranking officer of the Kuban Cossacks, *Koshovyi Otaman* Pylypenko, made a statement that in the case of further violation of the civil rights of his colleague the Cossacks would call for support from their historical homeland—Ukraine—and from the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States and Canada and would even defend themselves with arms. A special committee for the “Return of the Kuban to Ukraine,” led by General Siverov, was established in the Kuban region.⁴⁸

Ukrainian Cossack organizations from the very beginning declared Kuban to be a sphere of their special interests. There in 1992 they implemented tactics similar to those used by Galician Ukrainian organizations in eastern and southern Ukraine in 1990: a Cossack march to the area was organized to mark the bicentennial of Cossack resettlement to Kuban. The idea was supported by the hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks—the head of the social-psychological directorate of the Ukrainian army and its chief ideologist, General Volodymyr Muliava.

In August 1992, forty-four men, representing not western but eastern and southern Ukrainian oblasts, including the Donbass and Zaporizhzhia regions, took part in a horse march to the Kuban. The march was reportedly met with enthusiasm on the part of the local population.⁴⁹

There is no doubt that Ukrainian Cossack mythology is spreading to the former Cossack territories beyond the state borders of Ukraine. The Cossack past of these regions, which include also parts of the Voronezh Oblast in Russia and Trans-Dniestria in Moldova, is viewed by proponents of Ukrainian nationalism as an important instrument in the rekindling of Ukrainian national identity among the six million-plus Ukrainian diaspora in the former Soviet Union. With the development of Cossack movements in Russian Cossack regions of the Don and the North Caucasus, Ukrainian Cossack movements in those areas are gaining some sort of legitimacy for their presence in the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that the Russian Cossacks are generally viewed as partisans of the restoration of the Russian Empire, their demands for the self-government of the Cossack regions, including the Don area, are accelerating the disintegration tendencies in the Russian Federation.

On a number of occasions Ukrainian officials have rejected any claims made by proponents of Ukrainian nationalism to territories beyond the Ukrainian border, but the further development of the Russo-Ukrainian border conflict sooner or later could put forward Ukrainian territorial claims based on the principle of "historical justice," and a highly developed Cossack mythology could be used not only as an instrument for preserving Ukrainian territorial integrity but also as an argument for Ukraine's own territorial claims.

Conclusion

It is difficult if not impossible to overestimate the significance of the idea of national territory to the system of beliefs of every modern nation. Of no less importance for this system is the complex of historical myths that provides a nation with its own view of its past and tries to explain and justify a nation's territorial possessions or territorial claims against its neighbors. With the collapse and disintegration of world empires, the problem of the division of the territories between "old" imperial and "young" stateless nations has arisen. Historical ar-

guments and historical myths are of special importance for the justification of conflicting territorial claims of different nations.

The legitimacy of Ukrainian borders has been challenged often by Russian politicians on the grounds of historical legitimacy. The majority of them are rooted in the highly developed former Soviet Sevastopol mythology. In the case of Ukraine, as in other cases of territorial claims against other former Soviet republics, Russian politicians take as a point of departure the borders of the Russian Empire of the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, the period when the empire had reached its maximum territorial expansion. There is nothing new in this approach. For instance, Romanians usually claim the territory once united under the leadership of Michael the Brave at the beginning of the seventeenth century, while Poles claim the territory that belonged to their state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵⁰ On this issue a student of Russian foreign policy, N. Narochnitskaia, has posed a rhetorical question: “Why in the case of Crimea do we follow the borders of 1954, in the case of the Baltic region those of 1939 and in the case of the Kuril Islands those of 1855?”⁵¹

From the Ukrainian perspective, Cossack mythology is used to protect the national integrity of Ukraine. The myth emerged locally in Dnieper Ukraine in the early eighteenth century, and then with the help of the nineteenth-century nationalists, including the celebrated poet Taras Shevchenko, it was spread all over the Ukrainian ethnic territory. It was preserved best of all in a historically non-Cossack territory, Galicia, and with the beginning of glasnost made its successful return to the Cossack historical lands—the eastern territories of Ukraine on its current borderland with Russia. Cossack colonization during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the majority of these territories helped Ukrainian historians in their justification that these territories were a part of the Ukrainian state. Another argument used was Cossack participation in the imperial army, which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, helped to annex the vast territories of southern Ukraine to the empire and open them to Ukrainian colonization. In view of the current Russian-Ukrainian dispute over Crimea, the traditionally anti-Tatar character of Cossack mythology has dramatically changed. To foster cooperation between the Ukrainian and Tatar national movements, episodes of such cooperation in the past have been revived, thus transforming traditional Cossack mythology into the realm of countermyths. Being by its nature national and anti-imperialist,

the Cossack myth at the same time gives an opportunity to Ukrainian nationalistic circles to put forward claims to territories that were colonized by the Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but in the twentieth century were included into the Russian Federation.

Russian-Ukrainian territorial disputes are based on conflicting historical arguments and historical mythology. The periods of maximum territorial expansion of the Russian imperial state and the Cossack autonomous polities have been taken as a point of departure in the process of making territorial claims. Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the future of Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea fleet has developed in an atmosphere of the further deterioration of the economic situation and living standards of the Russian and Ukrainian populations and the activation of nationalistic and pro-communist forces. Both of these potentially dangerous processes are under way and threaten to bring current territorial disputes between Russia and Ukraine to the brink of military conflict. Conflicting territorial claims based on Russian imperial mythology and Ukrainian national myth could have dangerous consequences if one of the two sides were to try to realize its "historic right" by force. Historical arguments that have received so much attention and have become so important in the current Russian-Ukrainian dispute have to make way for the arguments of international law.

Notes

1. On the problem of imperial disintegration, national self-determination, and border conflicts, see Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (London: Collins/Fontana, 1969), pp. 295–99; J.R.V. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), pp. 109–78; John Coakley, "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the Formation of States in Europe," in *Frontier Regions in Western Europe*, ed. Malcolm Anderson (London: F. Cass, 1983), pp. 34–49.

2. See the statement by P. Voshchanov, *Izvestiia*, 29 August 1991.

3. See quotations from the internal memorandum on Crimea, prepared by V. Lukin, then chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Russian parliament and currently Russian ambassador to the United States (*Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 22 January 1991); interview with S. Baburin and N. Pavlov, members of the Russian parliamentary group that visited Crimea in December 1991 (*Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 31 January 1992); and Ukrainian protests on the creation and activities of the Russian Supreme Soviet ad hoc committee on Sevastopol's status, called into existence at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of Russia in December 1992 (*Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 11 December 1992; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 23 January 1993; *UKRAINFORM Reports*, 20 February 1993).

4. See *Pravda Ukrainy*, 7 April 1992. Quoted by Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 14 May 1992, p. 3.

5. *Ibid.*

6. See *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 8 January 1993. Compare to similar statements made by N. Narochnitskaia, *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 21 August 1992.

7. One of the best expressions of the Sevastopol myth is found in a verse by Aleksandr Nikolaev, published by *Literaturnaia Rossiia* on 8 January 1993:

Na oskolkakh nashei Sverkhderzhavy
Velichaishii paradoks istorii:
Sevastopol'—gorod russkoi slavy,
No . . . ne na Rossiiskoi territorii?

8. The Sevastopol siege of 1854–55 was the topic of "The Sevastopol Sketches" by Leo Tolstoy, which was approved by the Soviet authorities and included in the school curriculum on Russian literature. Soviet works on the Crimean War and the Sevastopol siege started to appear on the eve of World War II. See E.A. Berkov, *Krymskaia kampaniia* (Moscow, 1939); A.N. Lagovskii, *Oborona Sevastopolia: Krymskaia voina 1854–1855 gg.* (Moscow, 1939). The topic was very popular during the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people of 1941–45" and then during the Cold War. The majority of works that dealt with the topic treated the heroism of the imperial army at the Sevastopol siege as the heroism of the Russian people. This approach to Crimean War history was most profoundly expressed in a book by Evgenii Tarle, published by the publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1954: *Gorod russkoi slavy: Sevastopol v 1854–1855*. The definition of Sevastopol as a city of Russian glory had become from that time a symbolic one and was widely used in tourist guide books and propagandistic literature.

9. *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 8 January 1993.

10. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 23 January 1993.

11. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: MacMillan, 1944), p. 330.

12. There is significant literature on Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and his writings. One of the latest publications on Hrushevs'kyi is T. Prymak's *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

13. John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992), p. 133.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

15. On the development of Cossack mythology, see Frank E. Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research*, vol. 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 845–64; O.W. Gerus, "Manifestations of the Cossack Idea in Modern History: The Cossack Legacy and Its Impact," *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, no. 1–2 (1986), pp. 22–39.

16. For an outline of the Cossack period in Ukrainian history, see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association

with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), pp. 105–98; and O. Subtelny and I. Vytanovych, “Cossacks,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 593–95.

17. On the history of the Chernihiv region, see O. Backus, *The Motives of the West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377–1514* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1957); O.I. Derykolenko, M.T. Iatsura, “Chernihivs’ka oblast’,” *Radians’ka Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1972), vol. 4, p. 480; M.T. Iatsura, “Chernihivs’ka oblast’,” *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainy koi RSR: Chernihivs’ka oblast’* (Kiev, 1972), pp. 15–17.

18. On the history of Ukrainian settlement in Sloboda Ukraine see D. Bagalei (Dmytro Bahalii), *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1887); A.G. Sliusarskii, *Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie slobozhanshchiny* (Kharkiv, 1964); L.N. Chizhykova, *Russko-Ukrainskoe pogranich’e. Istoriia i sud’by traditsionno-bytovoï kul’tury (19–20 veka)* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 14–69.

19. For an account of the events, see Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, pp. 143–73.

20. See Elena Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda (ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie)* (Moscow, 1955); *idem*, *Severnoe Prichernomor’e v 1775–1800 gg.* (Moscow, 1959). The history of the imperial absorption of Crimea is presented by Alan W. Fisher in *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and in *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

21. On the partitions of Poland see Oskar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1952), pp. 258–75.

22. For Bezborod’ko’s views on the main goals of Russian foreign policy, see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 261–62.

23. On Ukrainian settlement of the new territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Nataliia Polons’ka-Vasylenko, *The Settlement of Southern Ukraine (1750–1775)*, *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA*, special issue, no. 4 (1955); V. Golobutskii (Volodymyr Holobuts’kyi), *Chernomorskoe kazachestvo* (Kiev, 1956); *idem*, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kiev, 1957), *idem*, *Zaporiz’ka Sich v ostanni chasy svoïo isnuvannia 1734–1775* (Kiev, 1961); V.M. Kabuzan, *Zaselenie Novorosii (Ekaterinoslavskoi i Khersonskoi gubernii) v 18–pervoï polvine 19 veka (1719–1859)* (Moscow, 1976); S.I. Bruk, V.M. Kabuzan, “Migratsii naseleniia v Rossii v 18–nachale 19 veka (chislennost’, struktura, geografiia),” *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1984).

24. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*, pp. 7, 29–32.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 59–63, 258–76.

26. On the reemergence of the Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi cult after the Poltava defeat, see Serhii Ploky, “The Symbol of Little Russia: Study in the Ideology of the Pokrova Icon,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (forthcoming).

27. On the gentry’s struggle for the recognition of its noble rights, see Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*, pp. 248–57. On the Ukrainian historiography of the period, see Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian*

Historiography, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA, special issue, vol. 5–6 (1957), pp. 44–115. *Istoriia Rusov* was extensively studied by Oleksander Ohloblyn. See his “The Ethical and Political Principles of *Istoriia Rusov*,” *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1952), pp. 670–95; *idem*, “Where Was *Istoriia Rusov* Written?” *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1953), pp. 670–93.

28. There is a great amount of literature that examines Shevchenko’s life and writings. On Shevchenko’s interpretation of Cossack history, see George Grabowicz, “Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol’, Ševčenko and Kulis,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, no. 5 (1981), pp. 179–94.

29. On the national revival in Galicia, see Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1819–1849* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1986); Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,” in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 315–52; John-Paul Himka, “Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867–1900,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 21 (1979), pp. 1–14; *idem*, “The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772–1918,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 8 (1984), pp. 426–52.

30. See Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, pp. 255–79; *Radians’ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1972), vol. 4, p. 461.

31. A general overview of the Soviet interpretations of Ukrainian and Belarusian history was done by Roman Szporluk in “National History as a Political Battleground: The Case of Ukraine and Belorussia,” in *Russian Empire: Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices*, ed. Michael S. Pap (Ohio, 1985), pp. 131–50. On Soviet interpretations of the Cossack past see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982).

32. On the national “awakening” among Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia of the period, see M. Koval’, “Pid ‘Kovpakom’ Beriivskoi Derzhbezpeky,” *Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, nos. 10–11 (1992), pp. 116–18.

33. On the political purge of the 1970s in Ukraine, see Roman Solchanyk, “Politics in Ukraine in the Post-Shelest Period,” in *Ukraine Since Shelest*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: University of Edmonton Press, 1983), pp. 1–29. On the fate of one of the persecuted, author and high Soviet official in the Zaporizhzhia region Mykola Kytsenko, see Olena Apanovych, “Nam bronzy ne treba!” *Ukrains’ka kul’tura*, no. 1 (1993), pp. 8–9.

34. On the 1990 celebrations of the five hundredth anniversary of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, see Sysyn, “Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation,” pp. 858–59.

35. This information is based on the author’s interviews with Communist Party officials in Cherkassy and Dnipropetrovs’k regions (summer 1990–spring 1991).

36. On the participation of CPSU officials in the celebrations of the 340-year anniversary of the Berestechko battle in Volhynia, see the joint statement on the occasion of the L’viv, Volhynia, and Rivno regional committees of the Communist Party, *Radians’ka Ukraina*, 13 February 1991.

37. A. Solzhenitsyn, “Kak nam obustroit’ Rossiuu?” *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 18

September 1990. See also Solzhenitsyn's "Appeal on the December 1991 referendum," in which he proposed to calculate the results of the referendum in Ukraine for each region separately: *Christian Democracy*, no. 17 (1992), pp. 9–10.

38. On the separatist tendencies in eastern and southern Ukraine, see M. Khudan, "Daiosh Respubliki Novorossii," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 22 November 1990; O. Oliinykiv, "Nashchadky Chepihy i Holovatoho," *Kul'tura i Zhyttia*, 5 August 1990; Sysyn, "Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation," p. 861.

39. See Leonid Zalizniak, "Vid kozats'koi vol'nosti—do Novorosii," *Pamiatky Ukrainy*, no. 2 (1991), p. 21, and Volodymyr Kravtsevych, "Berezan' i Izmail vziali zaporozhtsy," *Narodna armiiia*, 28 October 1992.

40. See V. Kravtsevych, "Kto zhe stroil 'Russkuiu Slavu'?" *Narodna armiiia*, 6 November 1992.

41. See the articles on Cossack history in *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, vols. 1–4 (Kiev, 1969–72).

42. See Roman Ivanychuk's memoirs in *Berezil'*, nos. 11–12 (1992), p. 125. The novel *Mal'vy* (first edition: *Mal'vy: Roman* [Kiev, 1968]) was not mentioned in the bibliographies of Ivanychuk's works until the beginning of glasnost.

43. See I. Storozhenko's essay on the 1648 Zhovti Vody battle in Iu. Mytsyk, I. Storozhenko, S. Ploky, A. Koval'ov, *Tii slavy kozats'koi povik ne zabudem* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1989); and list of Iu. Mytsyk's publications in *Bibliohrafiia prais vchenykh Dnipropetrovs'koho universytetu. Istoriiia Ukrainy XV–XVIII stolit, 1918–1990* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1992).

44. See V. Butkevych, "Pravo na Krym," *Narodna armiiia*, 8 July 1992. Pointing to the first abolition of the Sich by Peter I in 1709 and the resettlement of the Cossacks to the territories controlled by Crimean Tatars, Butkevych claimed that from 1709 to 1734 Zaporizhzhia and Crimea made up one state body, which gained international recognition according to the Prut Peace Treaty, signed between Russia and Turkey in 1711. He also stressed the special relations between Crimea and Zaporizhzhia on the eve of the imperial abolition of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775.

45. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 10 January 1991.

46. For a report on the visit of the folk ensemble "Cossacks-Zaporozhians" from the city of Zaporizhzhia to Sevastopol, see *Molod' Ukrainy*, 14 January 1993.

47. See the article on the history of Ukrainian settlements in Kuban by V. Ivanyts, V. Kubijovyc, and M. Miller in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 687–95. For a current interpretation of Kuban history in Ukraine, see Petro Lavriv, "Kubans'ki kozaky," *Narodna hazeta*, no. 8 (1993).

48. *Biuletyn' Ukrains'koi respublikans'koi partii*, no. 10 (1993). On the collaboration of the Ukrainian and Kuban Cossacks, see the statement of Hetman Volodymyr Muliava on the results of the meeting of the delegations of the Ukrainian and Kuban Cossacks in Kiev on 2 March 1993: *Molod' Ukrainy*, 19 March 1993.

49. See the article on this march in the newspaper of the Ukrainian armed forces, Anatolii Zaborovs'kyi, "Kozaky v kinnomu pokhodi," *Narodna armiiia*, 21 October 1992."

50. See Coakley, "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers," p. 41.

51. *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 21 August 1992.