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Author(s): OMELJAN PRITSAK

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The Pogroms of 1881*

OMELJAN PRITSAK

To Marc Raeff

The pogroms that began in the Russian Empire in April 1881 in the city of Elisavetgrad (now called Kirovohrad) are rightly regarded as a watershed in the history of modern Jewry.¹ Scholars have been unable to elucidate the causes of these deplorable events. The specialized literature suggests three sets of questions. The first set asks how the disturbances started, who started them, and whether they were planned or spontaneous.² The second set of questions deals with the character of the disturbances, that is, whether they were a rural or urban phenomenon.³ Finally, the third set inquires into the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the pogroms. Were they conditioned by "historical geography,"⁴ or were they sparked by the accelerating urbanization and industrialization of a backward society?⁵ The "historical geography" hypothesis proposes two basic catalysts for the pogroms:

* This is a revised version of a paper presented on 14 December 1980 at the conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the pogroms, arranged by the Center for Jewish Studies, Harvard University. I use this opportunity to express my thanks to Professors Ezra Mendelsohn and Marshall Shatz for their contribution in editing this version.

¹ The basic literature includes: Iulii Gessen, "Pogromy v Rossii," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 12, cols. 611–18; Shimon Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, trans. I. Friedlander, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1918), especially pp. 247–51; idem, *Evrei v Rossii i Zapadnoi Evrope v antisemitskoi reaktsii* (Moscow and Petrograd, 1923), especially pp. 11–15; Mina Goldberg, "Die Jahre 1881-1882 in der Geschichte der Russischen Juden" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Berlin 1933; hereafter cited as Goldberg); Mark Vishniak, "Antisemitism in Tsarist Russia," in K. S. Pinson, ed., *Essays on Antisemitism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1946), pp. 121–44; Yehuda Slutsky, "Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881," *He-avar* 9 (1962): 16–25; Slutsky, "Pogrom," *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1971), vol. 13, cols. 694–701; Hans Rogger, "The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism: A Reappraisal," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, 25, nos. 1–2, n.s. 22–23 (1971), pp. 42–51; J. Michael Aronson "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors in the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia," *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (1980): 18–31.

² Archival material published in 1923 absolves both the imperial government and revolutionary circles from complicity, but not (as is shown here) from covering up.

³ An urban origin is suggested by J. Michael Aronson in his "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors."

⁴ Elaborated by Yehuda Slutsky, "Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881."

⁵ The second view has been defended by J. M. Aronson in his "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors."

the alleged traditional rebelliousness of the local (Ukrainian) masses, and their alleged tradition of anti-Jewish hatred and persecution, going back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

I

Two groups of primary sources on the 1881 pogroms have been published: official documents from the archives of the Department of Police of the Ministry of the Interior in St. Petersburg, and private papers. The documents were published soon after the revolution of 1917 (when for a short time researchers had access to the state archives) by G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni.⁶ They consist of two parts: telegrams and reports, mainly from the local authorities to the imperial government; and a collection of memoranda and information received or compiled by the state-appointed investigator of the pogroms, Major-General Pavel Ippolitovich Kutaisov, dispatched to the south on 12 May 1881. The Kutaisov papers date from approximately May 1881 to February 1882. The instructions to Kutaisov, signed on May 12 by both the Minister of the Interior, Count N. P. Ignat'ev and the chief of the Department of Police, V. K. Plehve, required Kutaisov to visit all places where disturbances had occurred, to present an account of events, and to analyze what conditions caused the unrest.

The official documents list places and dates of the disturbances. In the majority of cases they also describe and estimate the value of the destroyed property. They do not, however, always give exact numbers of either the victims of the disturbances or of the rioters. Data about these groups are often incomplete. In 1929 the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Rybysn'kyi maintained that the materials published by Krasnyi-Admoni did not exhaust all documents relating to the pogroms of 1881 in the archives of the police department in St. Petersburg. Also, Krasnyi-Admoni did not deal at all with documents in the provincial archives, including those in the Kiev Central Historical Archives, where—according to Rybysn'kyi—Ukrainian documents that never reached the tsarist capital are stored.⁷

⁶ *Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii*, vol. 2: *Vos'midesiatye gody (15 aprelia 1881 g.—29 fevralia 1882 g.)*, edited and with an introduction by G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni (Petrograd and Moscow, 1923). Hereafter cited as Admoni.

⁷ Volodymyr P. Rybysn'kyi, "Prot'yievreis'kyi rukh r. 1881-ho na Ukraini," *Zbirnyk prats' ievreis'koi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi Komisii/Vseukrains'ka Akademiia Nauk. Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filolohichno Viddilu* 73.II (1929), 139–40. Hereafter cited as Rybysn'kyi.

In addition to the published documents, a description of the Elisavetgrad pogrom is among materials prepared at the direction of Baron G. Ginzburg for the use of Pahlen's Commission (1882). The description, written by a Jewish group, was later published by Shimon Dubnov.⁸

Most other publications and private papers relating to events in Elisavetgrad are not concerned directly with the pogrom.⁹ There are two exceptions: the reminiscences of a Russian public figure and publicist under the pseudonym P. Sonin-M., published in *Evreiskaia starina* in 1909,¹⁰ and a study by Volodymyr Rybys'kyi, published in Kiev in 1929, of the diary of a Ukrainian eyewitness of the Elisavetgrad pogrom, Opanas Mykhalevych, town physician and Ukrainian political activist.¹¹

II

On 1 March 1881, Alexander II was assassinated by members of the revolutionary organization *Narodnaia volia* ("People's Will"); among the conspirators was a Jewess.¹² During the latter half of March an intensive anti-Jewish campaign was launched in the Russian right-wing press, spearheaded on March 20 by *Novorossiiskii telegraf* published in Odessa.¹³ The press spread rumors that the Christian population of Novorossia (New Russia) was planning to mount anti-Jewish pogroms during the Easter holidays to avenge the killing of the "beloved Tsar." The city of Elisavetgrad was named as the starting point for the actions. Naturally enough, Elisavetgrad Jews asked the local police to take action to protect them. They also started to buy arms.

⁸ Dubnov, *Evrei v Rossii*, pp. 13–14; for an English translation, see his *History of the Jews*, 2: 250–51.

⁹ I have in mind the following documentary editions: *Die Judenpogrome in Russland. Im Auftrage des zionistischen Hilfsfonds in London*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1909–10); "Antievreiskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1881 i 1882 g. (Iz zapiski, prednaznachennoi dlia Palenskoi Kommissii)," *Evreiskaia starina*, 1909, pp. 88–109, 265–76; S. Dubnov, ed., "Zapiska ob antievreiskikh pogromakh 1881 goda," *Golos minuvshago* 1916, no. 3, pp. 243–53; N. M. Gelber, "Aktenshtuecke zur Geschichte der Judenpogrome in Russland im Jahre 1881," *Menorah* 5, no. 7 (1927): 7–13; idem, "Di rusishe pogromen onheyb di 80-er yorn in sheyn fun estereikhisher diplomatisher korespondents," *Historishe shriftn fun Yivo* 2 (1937): 466–96; E. Tscherikover, "Naye materialn vegn di pogromen in Rusland onheyb di 80-er yorn," *Historishe shriftn* 2 (1937): 444–65; Israel Bartal, ed., *Ha-sufot ba-negev 1881–1882* (Jerusalem, 1975).

¹⁰ P. Sonin-M., "Vospominaniia o iuzhnorusskikh pogromakh 1881 goda," *Evreiskaia starina* 1, no. 14 (1905): 207–81, especially 207–11. Hereafter cited as Sonin.

¹¹ Rybys'kyi, pp. 171–82.

¹² Hessia Helfman (1855–82).

¹³ See *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 12, col. 612, and Admoni, pp. 226, 230, 241.

On about March 15, the chief of the Elisavetgrad city police, Il'ia Petrovich Bogdanovich, received a strange visitor, who claimed to be a retired state councillor. He surprised the police chief by his strong anti-Jewish sentiments, and he spoke about an impending Jewish pogrom in Elisavetgrad. On about March 20, the state councillor departed, but his hotel room was taken by two young visitors, one from St. Petersburg and the other from Moscow. One was clad as a fashionable merchant, the other as a coachman. They visited local taverns and other establishments selling beer and liquor, and fraternized with the clientele.¹⁴

Following the instructions of the governor-general of Odessa, the governor of Kherson ordered, on April 10, that all police district chiefs exercise special vigilance during the Easter holidays.¹⁵ Consequently, the city administration of Elisavetgrad asked the commander of the military unit stationed nearby, General Kosich, to place some of his troops at the disposal of the chief of the city police for the duration of Easter.

The Easter holidays, April 12–14, passed without incident. The police and the military maintained order in the city. In the fair grounds (*moskovskie lavki*), the vodka taverns remained closed. Meanwhile, some twenty young strangers arrived in town, laden with money and attired like their two predecessors from the capitals. They mingled with the local people and were noted in different parts of the city.¹⁶

Since Easter had passed by without incident, on Wednesday, April 15 the chief of police informed General Kosich that there was no longer any need to maintain the state of alert. City life returned to normal: it was the first market day after Easter, and the prohibition against selling vodka was lifted. Peasants from the surrounding villages started to arrive; surprisingly, many of them were pulling empty carts.¹⁷ Around 2:00 p.m. the military retired to their barracks. The chief of police sent a telegram to the governor of Kherson with the assurance that life in Elisavetgrad had returned to normal.

¹⁴ Sonin, pp. 207–210.

¹⁵ Admoni, pp. 20, 241–43. The following presentation is based mainly on documents published by Admoni, Sonin, and Rybys'kyi.

¹⁶ See Sonin, pp. 212–13, and Rybys'kyi, p. 176. They were thought to be (and probably were) youths from Moscow, since in the sources they are several times referred to as “Moskvi-chi” (fellows from Moscow). See Admoni, pp. 77, 80, 400, and Rybys'kyi, pp. 165, 176.

¹⁷ Admoni, p. 211. The pogrom's organizers regarded the peasants as incapable of starting disturbances. They were only summoned to come to the city with empty carts to take away the Jews' property once it lay in the streets. This was the typical role of peasants in an urban pogrom. Compare, for example, the situation in Kiev (Admoni, p. 403) and Pereiaslav (Admoni, p. 114).

Two hours later, around 4:00 p.m. that same April 15, disturbances broke out in the marketplace. In a tavern owned by a Jew, a local drunk broke a vodka glass, which prompted the proprietor to strike him. Other drunk patrons let out cries of “the Jews are beating our people,” “the Jews have bribed the police,” and “the Jews have purchased firearms.” Havoc broke out. It spread to the surrounding taverns. Their patrons and the marketgoers turned into a mob. They robbed and destroyed Jewish shops and houses, throwing everything they found within them into the street.¹⁸

The mob in the marketplace was estimated by eyewitnesses to number about one thousand. Simultaneously, bands of about forty people each sprang up in different parts of the city, led by the strangers from the capitals.¹⁹ The mob included women of high society (some of whom participated in the drunkards’ orgies) and children, so the police, some of whom were also heavily intoxicated, avoided using force. The chief of police personally made futile efforts to stop the mob. At his order, some fifteen to twenty activists were arrested (the strangers from the capital were not caught). The police chief now demanded help from General Kosich, and soon one detachment of hussars arrived. With the hussars’ help, order was partially restored in the center of the city by evening. Only the synagogue was still beleaguered by the mob, which claimed that Jews were shooting from inside the building. The disturbances continued throughout the night. In one tavern an elderly Jew was found dead, the only fatality of the Elisavetgrad riots.

At about 7:00 a.m. on the morning of Thursday, April 16, the mob started to reappear in small groups, joined by peasants who continued to arrive for the post-Easter market. Many, as mentioned above, were pulling empty carts—an unusual circumstance. The newly arrived peasants did not actively participate in the riots, but some of them started to collect the “ownerless” goods in the streets. The military and the police had received no specific instructions on how to act. Now also organized into small units, they remained passive; some even accepted looted gifts, such as watches or sweets. Many of the policemen had already been treated to vodka.²⁰ In some instances the mob prevented the military from arresting rioters. The passivity of the local police and military units, under the inept command of General Kosich, gave rise to the idea that in fact the actions against the

¹⁸ See the diary of Mykhalevych, in Rybys’kyi, pp. 173–75.

¹⁹ Sonin, pp. 210–211.

²⁰ Some policemen voluntarily pointed out Jewish homes to the rioters so as to spare Christian houses and possessions. See Rybys’kyi, p. 174.

Jews were not a crime, but to the contrary had been instigated or were supported by the government.

The riots continued into late evening throughout the city, except in its center, where rich Jews and Christians lived; that quarter was well guarded by the military. General Kosich demanded more troops. Only after three cavalry squadrons of the Ol'viopol' regiment arrived, at about 11:00 p.m., did the military start to act professionally. The city was divided into several military sectors and placed under tight control. The peasants already in the city were not allowed to leave with looted goods. Sentries at the city gates prevented a new wave of peasants from entering. Finally order was restored, just before the arrival of the governor of Kherson, A. E. Erdeli, on the morning of Friday, April 17.

But the damage had already been done. On Thursday, April 16, for the first time, the looting and beating of Jews by a city mob had taken place in the presence of the police and military without their appropriate intervention. That day is responsible, in a sense, for the entire subsequent wave of pogroms in the Russian Empire. On that day was born the misguided conviction that the tsar's subjects had a duty to beat Jews.

III

The riots in Elisavetgrad directly ignited a total of five pogroms (and one failed attempt), all in places along the railway. These occurred in two waves, on April 16–18 (Elisavetgrad, Znam'ianka [Znamenka], Holta [Golta], Oleksandriia [Aleksandriia]) and on April 16–17 (Anan'iv [Anan'ev] and Berezivka [Berezovka]). The largest one took place in Elisavetgrad itself; it claimed one victim and caused extensive damage. The second largest pogrom took place at Berezivka, a town with a Jewish majority. The remaining three occurred on a much smaller scale. One attempted pogrom, at the city and railroad station of Oleksandriia, was aborted.²¹ All in all, forty-eight anti-Jewish disturbances occurred in Kherson guberniia between April 15 and April 28 of 1881. Six took place in cities and towns, and forty-two, the clear majority of them, in villages and hamlets. These stark figures impressed the imperial government. The official view concerning the pogroms of 1881, that of the Minister of the

²¹ The analysis of this and the other Elisavetgrad-centered pogroms is based on the material in Admoni (especially pp. 1–34, 226–316, 468–79, 530–39). See also the appendix and the map at the end of this article. In the appendix, the Russian place names used by the tsarist administration, which are provided in parentheses in the text, are in the first column. The nineteenth-century form Elisavetgrad is used throughout for present-day Kirovohrad.

Interior, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, was that they were essentially a rural phenomenon, provoked by Jewish economic exploitation of the illiterate peasantry. His view was shared by the contemporary Russian intelligentsia. The idea spread, due to the impact of populist theories, the blind disregard for the urban proletariat, and, above all, the superficial analysis of statistical data.

Contrary to the official statements, the disturbances of 1881 did not burst out spontaneously and simultaneously in different places. They were all imported from Elisavetgrad. Two incidents described in the official reports are typical. In the first case, three peasants from the village of Mala Mamaika (Malaia Mamaika) (10 km. northeast of Elisavetgrad) who had witnessed that neither the police nor the army had intervened in the beating of Jews and looting of their property, were persuaded by agitators that the tsar had issued an order (*ukaz*) to undertake a pogrom. Having arrived home (on the night of 16/17 April) these three peasants immediately destroyed the local Jewish tavern and, with some forty other villagers, proceeded to the neighboring village of Vysoki Bairaky (Vysokie Bueraki) (12 km. northeast of Elisavetgrad). There they mobilized some local people and vandalized the Jewish taverns. On the next day, April 17, peasants in the neighboring village of Mar''iivka (Mar'evka) (some 11 km. north of Elisavetgrad) demolished two taverns owned by Jews, one in their own village (Mar''iivka) and the other in Oleksandrivka (Aleksandrovka).²²

In a second instance, a peasant from Sofiivka (Sofievka), in the Vitiazivka (Vitiazevka) *volost'*, on his way to the town of Brats'ke (Bratskoe), witnessed on April 21 anti-Jewish disturbances in the town of Vitiazivka (77 km. southwest of Elisavetgrad). Believing in the existence of an order from the tsar to beat Jews, he decided—under the influence of alcohol consumed in Vitiazivka—to take an active part in this patriotic activity. Continuing his journey to the village of Antonopil' (Antonovka/Antonopol) (some 90 km. southwest of Elisavetgrad), he assembled the village elders, treated them to vodka, and proclaimed that as the tsar's messenger and a member of the secret police, he was entrusted with the destruction of Jewish property in the region. He invited the local authorities to cooperate in his undertaking, assuring them that he was in possession of a copy of the tsar's decree (*ukaz*). The self-styled imperial agent failed to provoke a disturbance in Antonopil' because the local tavern owner had a reputation of being a "good Jew." So the peasant from Sofiivka, assisted by the Antonopil' village authorities, proceeded to the villages located further out. In two of them, Katerynivka (Katerinovka) and Khutor Gavrilenvov, he was

²² Admoni, pp. 23, 252, 477–78.

content to force the innkeeper to provide his party with vodka, but in the third, Kam'ianuvatka (Kamenovodka), the drunken "crusaders" destroyed the local Jewish tavern. The spree ended when the party arrived in Brats'ke, where the drunken adventurer was himself arrested.²³

These two well-documented instances prove beyond any doubt that the pogrom-like disturbances in each locality were not spontaneous, snowballing peasant movements. The incidents occurred at the instigation of outside agitators claiming to be executing the tsar's will. An analysis of the chronology and geography of the Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances shows that the unrest was imported from the urban center along railway lines and then along water and land routes. Illiterate peasants participated in the disturbances, not due to an alleged traditional rebelliousness, but because misguided by agitators from the cities, they believed themselves to be faithfully implementing the orders of their patrimonial tsar.²⁴

Disturbances in the countryside around Elisavetgrad were minor, and the number of both instigators (between one and eight) and "fellow-travelers" (between five and forty) was insignificant. There were, in fact, no real "pogroms" in the countryside, but rather forty-two relatively mild "disturbances." In only a few of the villages in which disturbances occurred were there any resident Jews (and even then, usually only a few); in many of the villages, there were Jewish taverns but no resident Jews (see the appendix). Whereas in Elisavetgrad itself 418 houses and 290 shops, with a total value of 1,938,209 rubles, were destroyed, in the entire Elisavetgrad uezd of 619 villages and hamlets, only twelve houses, eleven shops, and twenty-three taverns were damaged, with a total value of 29,157 rubles. In the forty-two hamlets and villages located in the guberniia's three uezds (Elisavetgrad, Oleksandriia, and Anan'iv) that underwent turmoil, damage was also comparatively low: forty-three houses, nineteen shops, and thirty-two taverns, for a total damage claim of 59,665 rubles. These figures (see the appendix) confirm that the Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances had no home base in the villages. My detailed study—here and in the appendix—is limited largely to those waves of the pogroms that were centered in Elisavetgrad, because

²³ Admoni, pp. 249–50, 475–77.

²⁴ Mykhalevych cites one case in Elisavetgrad where peasants willingly spared an elderly Jew, but since they were afraid not to have obeyed the tsar's order, they pretended to have pillaged his home (Rybyns'kyi, p. 175; see also Admoni, p. 471). In some instances Christians willingly concealed Jewish property during days of crisis; see Rybyns'kyi, pp. 141–42. The peasants of Abramivka (Abramovka) (Kirovohrads'ka oblast') gave protection to Jews from the hamlet of Poklitarivka (Poklitarovka). Controversy arose around an army officer's excessively severe punishment of several of Poklitarivka's peasants for their attacks on Jews; see Admoni, p. 250.

only a microanalytic inquiry into the first instance of the phenomenon can facilitate the study of the whole.

IV

The Elisavetgrad region was still colonial territory during the first half of the nineteenth century. It came under Russian rule piecemeal during the second half of the eighteenth century, when the tsarist empire absorbed the former states of the Zaporozhian Sich (Host) and the Crimean Khanate. All cities, towns, and the great majority of villages were new settlements established there from the second half of the eighteenth to the first half of the nineteenth century. The city of Elisavetgrad was founded as a Russian military stronghold. Its first buildings were constructed between 1754 and 1757 as part of a line of fortification against the Turks. The region was called *Nova Serbiia* (New Serbia), since it was originally settled by Serbo-Croatian mercenaries from the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Around the fortress there soon settled non-military people of various origins. By 1757 the town comprised 128 dwellings, and by 1788 that number had increased to 1,062 dwellings with 4,746 inhabitants. Between 1788 and 1823 these numbers doubled. In 1803 there were already 574 Jews listed in the municipal register, and by 1861 their number increased to 8,073 (out of a total population of ca. 23,000). The 1897 census records 23,967 Jews in Elisavetgrad, or about 39 percent of the total population of 61,488. Many other nationalities were also represented in the city: apart from Ukrainians and Jews, the inhabitants were Moldavians, Bulgars, Germans, Poles, Russians and others. The Ukrainians were clearly in the minority.

The comparatively recent origins of Elisavetgrad and the very mixed character of its population would argue against the importance of geographic or ethnic factors in explaining the outbreak of the pogroms.²⁶ Neither a traditional rebelliousness among the local “masses,” nor an anti-Jewish hatred going back to the Khmel’nyts’kyi era (1648) and the Haidamak uprising (1768) existed in or around Elisavetgrad. Although repeated in many scholarly and popular books, this thesis is simply wrong.

²⁵ On the colonization of Elisavetgrad and the southern Ukraine, see E. I. Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800–1825 gg.* (Moscow, 1970); idem, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma 1825–1860 gg.* (Moscow, 1981); D. S. Syvolap, ed., *Kirovohrads’ka oblast’, Istoriia mist i sil Ukrain’skoi RSR* (Kiev, 1972), esp. pp. 81–93. On the pre-1897 history of Elisavetgrad, see also “Elisavetgrad” in *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 7, cols. 513–14; and Aleksei N. Pashutin, *Istoricheskii ocherk g. Elisavetgrada* (Elisavetgrad, 1897).

²⁶ Slutsky, “Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881.”

The anti-Jewish excesses of July 1648, a time before Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi consolidated his power, occurred in the western part of the Cossack territories (the *polky*, or the districts of Bratslav, Kal'nyk, Bila Tserkva [Belaia Tserkov'], and Uman').²⁷ They did not extend to the territory of the later Kherson guberniia, the larger part of which was then included in the Chyhyryn (Chigirin) *polk* (the other part remained within the Crimean Khanate).

Chyhyryn was Khmel'nyts'kyi's home. If the traditions of the hetman and his slogans were preserved anywhere, it was in Chyhyryn. Small wonder that General Kutaisov, the imperial special investigator of the 1881 pogroms, was surprised to learn that in the town where, as he put it, "the soil was best prepared" for anti-Jewish excesses, no disturbances whatsoever occurred.²⁸

The Haidamak rebellion was limited to the Ukrainian territories within the Polish Commonwealth; it did not extend to those under Russian rule, or to the lands then part of the Crimean Khanate.²⁹ The nineteenth-century uyezds of Elisavetgrad and Oleksandriia in the Kherson guberniia were part of the Russian Empire in 1768 and the Anan'iv uезд was part of the Crimean Khanate until 1791.

The largest single group in Elisavetgrad was the Jews; other residents were, as mentioned, colonists varying in ethnic origin. In 1881 only some 55 percent of the city's inhabitants had been born in the city itself;³⁰ about 25 percent were immigrants, mainly from the neighboring Ukrainian and Central Russian territories.

²⁷ Details in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 3 (Kiev and Vienna, 1922), pp. 28–50. Important is the opposition between the leader of the mob, whom the Cossacks called Maksym Kryvonos (according to a contemporary [1649] German account, *Gründliche und denkwürdige Relation der Newlichen Cosaken-Revolte wider die Cron-Polen unter Commando gen. Chmielnicki* . . . , p. 7, "der gen. Major Krziwanos" was a mercenary of Scottish extraction), and the nobleman (*szlachcic*) Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who was only then emerging as the Cossack's leader. A new analysis of "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War" was undertaken by Bernard D. Weinryb, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 153–77.

²⁸ Admoni, p. 416.

²⁹ Aleksandr Lola, *Haidamats'kyi rukh na Ukraini v XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, ed. Ivan Butych and Fedir Shevchenko (Kiev, 1970); Władysław Serczyk, *Koliszczyzna* (Cracow, 1968); Serczyk, *Hajdamacy* (Cracow, 1972); Zenon E. Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 359–78; Omeljan Pritsak, "Ukraine as the Setting for the Emergence of Hasidism," *Israel and the Nations. Essays. . . in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger* (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. lxvii–lxxxiii.

³⁰ *Kirovohrads'ka oblast'*, p. 86.

Several rallying cries chanted during Elisavetgrad's pogroms were noted and recorded; none refer either to Khmel'nyts'kyi or to the Haidamaks. The constant and most vehement cry heard in 1881 was contemporary, not historical, in nature: "The Jews killed the emperor. There is an order to beat them. The local authorities are hiding it."³¹ This slogan was often combined with one giving vent to financial grievances: "The Jews are our bloodsuckers and predators."³² Various versions arose: "Beat the Jew, and pillage his property,"³³ or "Why, it is Jewish-owned, therefore seize it."³⁴

V

The historical-geographical explanation for the pogroms in the Kherson guberniia has been based on false premises. The pogroms and disturbances of 1881 were not a rural, but an urban phenomenon. They were not conditioned or facilitated by historical geography, since the territory in question knew neither the tradition of rebelliousness nor that of anti-Jewish hatred and persecution. Moreover, there was no spontaneity in the "waves" of pogroms. They were artificially instigated via a newly built communication network—the railroad—and they traveled from one city, and its adjacent towns, to the next. Elisavetgrad was probably chosen to be the starting point for the pogroms because it had a large Jewish population, was located centrally in relation to other centers of Jewry in the south, and was connected to them by rail. It may be that the disturbances (relatively mild) in rural villages and hamlets were a cover-up meant to strengthen the Russian intelligentsia's myth about the peasants' explosive, self-generated, anti-Jewish sentiments.

The published official data about the rioters arrested in Elisavetgrad and other places in Kherson guberniia are very incomplete. Of the 607 riot suspects arrested in Elisavetgrad, data on the social status of only 498 and on the occupation of only 363 are available.³⁵ Also, the official statistics say nothing about the young "visitors" from the capitals. Even so, the official documents contain vital information.

The majority of rioters arrested were Orthodox (562); among them were 181 townsmen, 130 "retired soldiers," 6 foreigners, 1 honorary nobleman, 3 "others," and 177 peasants. The unusually high number of "retired

³¹ Admoni, pp. 254, 481.

³² Admoni, p. 479.

³³ Admoni, pp. 477–78, 481.

³⁴ Admoni, pp. 244–45; see also 252, 476.

³⁵ Admoni, pp. 536–37.

soldiers'' arrested is puzzling: who were they, and why were they among the rioters? The ratio of peasants to non-peasants is also surprising: 177 to 321. This figure alone contradicts the assumption that the pogroms of 1881 were essentially a peasant-perpetrated phenomenon.

Of the 181 townsmen, only 69 were local people from Elisavetgrad. Who were the other 112, and what was their place of residence? The official data give information about only eight rioters from outside Elisavetgrad, all of whom were residents of Ukrainian towns:

Kremenchuh	3
Kherson	2
Myrhorod	1
Tarashcha	1
Chyhyryn	1

The majority of arrested peasants were strangers in Elisavetgrad: 105 of the 117 peasants arrested claimed residence outside the city. There is official documentation for only 14 of the 105:

(a) Peasants from the Ukraine:	Kiev region	1
	Podillia region	1
	Chyhyryn region	1
		—
		3
(b) Peasants from Russia:	Kaluga region	4
	Kursk	3
	Tula	2
	Penza	1
	Riazan'	1
		—
		11

Of the eighty-four rioters arrested in the Oleksandriia uezd—for whom, surprisingly, detailed data are available—only about one-third were Orthodox Christians; the majority were Russian sectarians.³⁶ Of the 118 persons (including twenty females) arrested in the town of Anan'iv, ninety-two were townsmen, twenty were "retired soldiers," and only five were peasants.³⁷ In the town of Berezivka, of the 120 persons arrested sixty-four were townsmen, sixteen were "retired soldiers," and forty—or exactly one-third of those arrested—were peasants.³⁸

³⁶ Admoni, p. 538.

³⁷ Admoni, p. 539.

³⁸ Admoni, p. 538–39.

As noted, information about the rioters arrested in Elisavetgrad is incomplete; occupations are noted for only 363 people.³⁹ Strangely enough, large numbers of them were either unskilled workmen (102), day laborers (eighty-seven), or domestics (thirty-three)—all part of the incipient proletariat. There were also six prostitutes and thirteen unemployed people. The number of non-peasants was 288. That is, only seventy-five of the 363 rioters whose occupation is known were peasants, or only about one-fifth of the total number arrested.⁴⁰

Fortunately, there were very few fatalities during the disturbances and pogroms—one elderly Jew⁴¹ was found dead in Elisavetgrad and the mutilated bodies of two Jews were found in Berezhivka.⁴² The documents published by Krasnyi-Admoni give some details about the social status and the occupation of a number of Jews victimized in Elisavetgrad. It is clear that most of them belonged to the class of poor townsmen.

The pogrom did not touch Jewish financial potentates in Elisavetgrad; the twenty-one Jewish-owned industrial plants in the city were not disturbed at all,⁴³ nor were the fashionable villas of their owners harmed. The same situation prevailed in Anan'iv.⁴⁴ Apparently, the Elisavetgrad pogrom was not instigated with the aim of directly harming Jewish lives and/or financial interests in the cities, but rather to send a *message* (see p. 29), and to create the illusion of rural anti-Jewish popular ire.

VI

What was the attitude of the authorities?⁴⁵ The Elisavetgrad region was part of the guberniia of Kherson, in turn a component of the general-government of Odessa. As in all other parts of the empire, the maintenance of law and

³⁹ Admoni, p. 537.

⁴⁰ Mina Goldberg concludes: "...die ortsansässigen Bauern zu den Ausschreitungen gegen die Juden lediglich verleitet worden. ...im Pogrom von Elisavetgrad waren die meisten Plünderer aus den großrussischen Gouvernements zugezogene Bauern und Arbeiterscharen. ... Die innere Einstellung der Bauern Südrußlands zu den Pogromen läßt sich durch die erhobenen Proteste der einzelnen Bauerngemeinden gegen die Plünderer erkennen. ...'" (Goldberg, pp. 38–39).

⁴¹ Admoni, p. 22.

⁴² Admoni, p. 92.

⁴³ Admoni, p. 494.

⁴⁴ Admoni, p. 255.

⁴⁵ On the problem in general, see Nikolai P. Eroshkin, *Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1983); P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978); F. Stein, *Geschichte des russischen Heeres* (Hannover, 1885).

order in the urban areas was the job of imperial police officers, whereas in hamlets and villages (after 1864) it was the responsibility of locally elected peasant officers, supervised by the police. The imperial police was headed by the chief of the Department of Police, a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior. In 1881 the imperial police was understaffed⁴⁶ and unprepared to combat urban riots. The local peasant officers were usually uneducated and lacked professional training.

When suddenly confronted with a large-scale riot, the inexperienced *Po-litseimeister* of Elisavetgrad, Cavalry Captain I. P. Bogdanovich,⁴⁷ lost his head and failed to specify orders properly to the division commander, General Kosich. Kosich received muddled instructions, too, from his other superiors, especially from the governor-general of Odessa and the governor of Kherson. Kosich, inexperienced in urban unrest, remained more or less immobile for two crucial days. The result was two unrestrained days of looting and destruction of property. Only after the governor-general of Odessa dispatched several more experienced officers, including the governor of Kherson, to the town, and the commander of the Seventh Corps summoned additional troops—one battalion of infantry and three squadrons of ulans, which arrived in Elisavetgrad on the morning of April 17—were the riots quelled.

In general, peasant elders responded positively to the summons of their police officers. In some instances, however, an uneducated *starosta* fell prey to anti-Jewish agitators and led the rioters or otherwise cooperated with the instigators. In two cases, *starostas* fled their villages. Punitive mounted patrols, usually one squadron of fifteen to eighteen men, were sent to quell village riots.

The imperial authorities—especially General Kosich, who came under the severe criticism of special investigator Kutaisov—were not very efficient in managing the Elisavetgrad events, but they did try to restore peace and order. To spare Odessa (and Kishinev), the governor-general of Odessa unhesitatingly called up a detachment of the awesome Don Cossacks; he also sent his chief of gendarmes to exposed Berezivka and Anan'iv. When word spread about the cooperation of military troops with rioters in Elisavetgrad, the matter was immediately put under police investigation.

⁴⁶ In the trade and industrial center of Elisavetgrad (43,000 inhabitants in 1881) there were only six senior police officers and eighty-one policemen. The other uезд centers of the guberniia that experienced disturbances had even smaller police forces, each employing four senior officers and nine to twelve policemen. See Admoni, p. 488.

⁴⁷ Pashutin, *Istoricheskii ocherk*, p. 33.

The imperial authorities were as surprised by the outbreak of the pogroms as were government officials on the local level. It is impossible to suspect them of organizing the pogroms or of complicity in them. But once the disturbances began, the authorities did their best to cover up the actions of the non-peasant ringleaders. Some blatant examples are discussed in the following section.⁴⁸

VII

It has already been shown that the Elisavetgrad pogrom was neither a spontaneous movement nor a rural phenomenon. Nor was it conditioned or facilitated by so-called historical geography. The only explanation remaining to be considered is that the pogroms were the result of an urban conspiracy.

The historian Hans Rogger formulated the vital question well in 1971, giving it two components: "Who were those roving bands of young men from St. Petersburg or Moscow whose appearance in Ukrainian towns and cities supposedly presaged a pogrom, and who, if anyone, had sent them on their ugly missions?"⁴⁹

The answer to both parts of Rogger's question may be found in the documents relating to the Zhmerynka pogrom which occurred at the end of April: first, the 1881 pogroms were apparently planned by Moscow merchants; second, the hired executors of their designs were demonstrably members of the *artels* of highly mobile railroad workers.

Zhmerynka (Zhmerinka), a regional center in the Vinnytsia oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR, is located in Podillia (Podolia), forty-seven kilometers from the city of Vinnytsia.⁵⁰ The town grew around a railroad station established in 1865, when the Kiev-Balta line was built. Due to its strategic location, the station became, over the next ten years, an important railroad junction of European Russia. In 1871 Zhmerynka became connected to the western frontier station of Volochys'k (Volochnysk), and thus gained control over traffic to the Austrian Empire. But of still greater importance for Zhmerynka was the construction of the Odessa-Kiev rail line in 1866-1871, which meant that Zhmerynka was now linked on the one side to Odessa, and on the other to Kiev, and via Kiev-Konotop (Konotop)-Kursk, to Moscow.

⁴⁸ A typical example: Governor A. E. Erdeli granted his permission for the organization of a relief committee to help the arrested rioters; Admoni, p. 281.

⁴⁹ Rogger, "The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism," p. 45.

⁵⁰ See A. F. Oliynyk, ed., *Vinnyts'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1972), p. 217; "Zhmerynka," in *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (hereafter *REIU*), vol. 2 (Kiev, 1970), p. 150.

On 27-28 April 1881, there was a pogrom in Zhmerynka.⁵¹ It was perpetrated by an artel of railroad workers. The two main instigators were the technician Aleksandr Paderin, head of the fifth division of the Southwestern Railroad, and Ivan Glazkov, supervisor of the artel of carpenters working for the railroad. Of importance is Glazkov's statement to the local police officer (*uriadnik*) on April 27 that "the Moscow merchantry sent several hundred workers to beat Jews, and said that those who beat Jews would not be [held] responsible for their actions, since there is nothing against the government in it."⁵²

Every time there was a lull in the rioting, Paderin would appear and rouse the looters once again, treating them to vodka with the cry: "Boys (*rebiata*), you do not work properly—you should have more vodka!" As a result, the railroad workers destroyed ninety-five Jewish houses and shops, valued at 95,000 rubles.⁵³

On the night of April 28, the military arrived, and ninety-nine rioters were arrested, among them the two instigators. Early in the morning of May 1, the procurator of the Odessa juridical chamber, which had authority over Zhmerynka, arrived and started investigations. Of the ninety-nine persons arrested, sixty-three were sentenced. Paderin received a three-month prison sentence. But then a surprising thing happened: the governor-general of Kiev, General Aleksandr Romanovich Drentel'n, ordered that Paderin immediately leave the Ukraine ("the Southwestern territories").⁵⁴ Strange, too, is that General Drentel'n gave no details about the Zhmerynka pogrom or resulting trials in his telegrams and reports to the Minister of the Interior. Information about these matters comes only from the papers of Kutaisov.

Fastiv (Fastov), like Zhmerynka, owed its importance to the construction of the Kiev–Odessa rail line, whereupon it became a railroad junction.⁵⁵ In 1876, a line connecting Fastiv with Znam'iianka (Znamenka), near Elisavetgrad, was built. One of the stations on that line was the small town (*mestechko*) of Smila (Smela), which had a Jewish majority. No details are available about a pogrom known to have occurred at the Fastiv railroad station.⁵⁶ There is some information, however, about a violent pogrom that occurred in Smila on May 3-4; there some 6,000 people, mainly newcomers

⁵¹ Details in Admoni, pp. 292-95; 417-21.

⁵² Admoni, p. 292.

⁵³ Admoni, p. 292. Compare the total damage claim of 59,665 rubles caused by the rural rioters in *all* Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances (p. 15).

⁵⁴ Admoni, p. 420.

⁵⁵ M. F. Rudych, ed., *Kyivs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1971), pp. 679, 683; *REIU* 4 (1972): 377.

⁵⁶ Admoni, p. 12 (doc. 36).

from the Central Russian provinces, rioted, four people were killed, thirty-five wounded, and about 800 Jews suffered loss of property amounting to 200,000 rubles.⁵⁷ Three individuals were found to be the main instigators: Aristid Mikhailov Gievskii, secretary of the Fastiv railroad; Dr. Adolf L. Bernshtein, a Jewish convert and director of Smila's Sophia Hospital, belonging to the counts Bobrinskii (owners of several local sugar factories); and Ivan I. Monastyrskii, an official of the Fastiv railroad, whose father was in the service of the counts Bobrinskii.⁵⁸ The documents do not say whether the three instigators were punished.

On May 5-6, there was a pogrom at the frontier railroad station of Volochys'k.⁵⁹ Whereas telegrams to the Minister of the Interior repeatedly call the rioters "peasants,"⁶⁰ special investigator Kutaisov referred to them as "drunken railroad workers."⁶¹

Located at the other end of the Ukrainian territories, on the Kiev-Kursk line leading to Moscow, was the railroad junction of Konotip (Konotop).⁶² On April 27, two hundred railroad workers, including some supervisors, staged a pogrom in Konotip.⁶³ Again government action was surprising: the governor of Kharkiv (Kharkov), General Sviatopolk-Mirskii, stated in a telegram of May 27 to the Minister of the Interior that most of the suspects were released because of lack of evidence against them.⁶⁴

The danger coming from the direction of Kursk (Moscow) was fully realized by the director of the Kursk-Kharkiv-Azov railroad, who, in a letter to the governor of Kharkiv, dated May 7, informed him about a successful preemptive pacification of his work force of 1,325 (employees, masters, foremen, and workers). All these men, after having stated that they had no financial or other complaints, were induced to swear not to participate in any riots or anti-Jewish activities.⁶⁵ The texts of two supporting documents were appended to the director's letter, and are preserved among the papers of Kutaisov.⁶⁶

⁵⁷ Admoni, p. 28 (doc. 65), pp. 107-11, 208-19, 534.

⁵⁸ Admoni, pp. 108-11. The other instigators were rich and influential townsmen, the brothers Grigorii and Amos Ivanov (alias Sysenkov, Sysenko), the telegraphist (sic!) Aleksandr Ivanov Sergeev, and Efim Gusev, son of a rich merchant (sic!). Admoni, pp. 102, 112.

⁵⁹ On Volochys'k, see M. I. Mekheda, ed., *Khmel'nyts'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1971), pp. 145-47.

⁶⁰ Admoni, p. 31 (doc. 71), 32 (doc. 72), 35 (doc. 85), 36 (doc. 87).

⁶¹ Admoni, p. 421; see also p. 531.

⁶² On Konotip, see I. Makukhin, ed., *Sums'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1973), p. 252; *REIU* 2: 462-63.

⁶³ Admoni, p. 11 (doc. 35), pp. 13-14 (doc. 41).

⁶⁴ Admoni, p. 17 (doc. 54).

⁶⁵ Admoni, pp. 295-96 (doc. 26).

⁶⁶ Another important railroad junction was Kremenchuh in Poltava guberniia. On that city, which had a large Jewish population, see I. T. Bulanyi, ed., *Poltavs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1967), pp. 463-70; *REIU* 2: 501-502; *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 9, cols. 832-33. After the

The data assembled here prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the highly mobile railroad workers were the main executors of the pogroms in 1881. The data tell us also about the strange behavior of the imperial authorities and establishment. After a certain pogrom or disturbance occurred, the authorities did their best to wipe out all trace of the true ringleaders, usually the “stars” from the capitals (*stolichnye gosti*). True, the authorities did not initiate the pogroms, but they certainly were culpable of covering up and destroying the “smoking guns.” This was due mainly to their indoctrination and the brainwashing effect of the fashionable populist dogma that the pogroms were a rural phenomenon, allegedly the expression of “popular ire” against Jewish economic exploitation. The authorities not only subscribed to this artificial construct, but also sympathized with the pogrom activists and ringleaders. Seldom would they arrest such *persona grata*, and when they did, they would not persecute them seriously (see the case of Paderin, above).

It was also redundant: the lesser authorities conscientiously falsified their reports in order to mollify their superiors. Instead of naming the true culprits—the railroad workers and other representatives of the incipient urban proletariat—the reports included the usual face-saving formulas—“peasants” and “popular ire.”⁶⁷

VIII

What was the role of the Moscow merchants in the 1881 riots? The Moscow merchants, the largest single group among the merchants of the empire (see the reference to the *moskovskie lavki*, above), were of the oriental, very conservative type. Even in the nineteenth century, they traded on the streets and in open air markets (the city of Moscow had forty-one such markets, varying in size); as in the Near East, “trade rows” (*lavki*), or separate passageways, concentrated on particular specialties. They vehemently opposed Western innovations, like banking or commercial exchange, until 1886,

pogroms in Kiev and Konotip, the governor of Poltava, Bil’basov, summoned to Poltava the 35th Briens’k Infantry Regiment, despite the Jewish population’s complaints about the inconvenience of having an occupying army in their city. See Admoni, pp. 29–30 (doc. 68). On the role of railroads and railroad workers in the 1881 pogroms, see Admoni, pp. 40–41 (doc. 99). Evidence about that role surprised the imperial administration, which expected peasants to be the main perpetrators.

⁶⁷ See also the statement by Goldberg: “Da die Spuren der Rädelsführer und die der Provokation der Beamten von den Behörden völlig verwischt wurden, ist es unmöglich, einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen einzelnen Urhebern der Pogrome zu rekonstruieren” (Goldberg, p. 39).

when the government ordered the demolition of the *lavki* in the Moscow Kitai-gorod.⁶⁸

In the century between 1750 and 1850–61, the Moscow merchants encountered three types of competitors.⁶⁹ Two types—the noble industrialist and the serf-peasant trader—were of domestic origin and therefore manageable. But the third competitor was foreign, and so posed a real danger. The foreign capitalist and producer of goods, the merchant of the new West European type, was a threat with which Moscow merchants, encountering them first through the Congress Kingdom of Poland, had to come to grips. The catalyst for conflict, which developed from the 1840s to the 1880s, was the activity of Polish-Jewish merchants and industrialists, centered in Warsaw/Łódź⁷⁰ and in Odessa, expanding into the Ukrainian territories of the Russian Empire, until then the preserve of the Moscow merchants.⁷¹

The Ukrainian territories that were part of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century comprised the following four zones. Each had a unique historical past before it was incorporated into the empire:⁷² (1) Sloboda Ukraine/Left-Bank Ukraine, with its center of Kharkiv; (2) Malorossia/Het'manshchyna, with centers in Chernihiv (Chernigov) and Poltava; (3) Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai, with centers in Kiev and Berdychiv (Berdichev); (4) Novorossia/Southern Ukraine, with its center of Odessa.

The Sloboda Ukraine came into existence in the 1630s, as a colonial enterprise of Ukrainian Cossack and peasant refugees from the Polish Commonwealth who submitted to the tsar of Muscovy. It was incorporated (more or less) into the Muscovite economic system during the eighteenth

⁶⁸ See Robert Gohstand, "The Shaping of Moscow by Nineteenth-Century Trade," in Michael F. Hamm, ed., *The City in Russian History* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1976), pp. 160–81, especially 163, 165, 171; idem, "The Geography of Trade in Nineteenth-Century Russia," in James H. Buter and R. A. French, eds., *Studies in Russian Historical Geography*, vol. 2 (London, 1983), pp. 329–72.

⁶⁹ See Alfred J. Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), pp. 40–79.

⁷⁰ This was especially true after the abolition in 1851 of the tariff border between the Kingdom of Poland and the rest of the empire.

⁷¹ On the competition between Polish and Russian merchants and industrialists in the Ukraine, see Oleksandr Ohloblyn, *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabрики: Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika* (Kiev, 1925), reprinted in O. Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry* (Munich, 1971).

⁷² For general information, see: Volodymyr Holubuts'kyi, *Ekonomichna istoriia Ukrain's'koi RSR. Dozhovtnevyi period* (Kiev, 1970); F. Los', ed., *Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrain's'koi RSR*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1967); Ivan Hurzhii, *Rozvytok tovarnoho vyrobnytstva i torhivli na Ukraini (z kintsia XVIII st. do 1861 roku)* (Kiev, 1962); idem, *Ukraina v systemi vserosiis'koho rynku 60–90kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev, 1968). See also A. Shevel'ev, ed., *Istoriia Ukrain's'koi RSR*, vol. 3 (Kiev, 1978).

century. Even in the nineteenth century, despite the Ukrainian national revival in Kharkiv guberniia, for instance, 64 percent of the merchants were Russians.⁷³ The former Hetman State (1648–1785), or *Malorossiiia*, was incorporated into the empire only between 1764 and 1785, but it started losing economic independence soon after the defeat at Poltava (1709). The imperial government assumed the right to regulate Malorossiiia's imports and exports to the benefit of the Moscow merchants by means of prohibitions and special tariffs.⁷⁴ Beginning in the 1830s the Moscow merchants unexpectedly met with fierce competition there, coming from the Congress Kingdom of Poland.⁷⁵ This and the rebirth of the Ukrainian merchant class⁷⁶ changed the economic picture, so that by 1897 the role of Russian merchants in Malorossiiia had decisively declined, to 25 percent in the Chernihiv and Kiev guberniias and 13 percent in the Poltava guberniia.⁷⁷

The *Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai* (Polish: Podole, Wolyń, Ukraina; during the nineteenth century the general-government of Kiev, Podillia [Podolia], and Volhynia) became part of the Russian Empire as a result of the second and third partitions of Poland (1793, 1795). Consequently the imperial administration regarded it as a Polish territory until the Polish uprising of the 1860s. Only at that time, under the impact of Slavophile ideology, did the imperial bureaucracy change its policy and begin to de-Polonize the “aboriginal Russian” land. The urban and mercantile population of the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai was basically Jewish, centered in the *mestechki* (*shtetl*) or towns. The economic center for these *mestechki* was Berdychiv,⁷⁸ then the second largest Jewish community in the empire: in 1847, Jews numbered 32,761 out of a total population of 41,000. In 1855, the city's guild members numbered 2,812 Jews and 70 Christians. Berdychiv also housed a branch of the Polish State Bank.

⁷³ Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 93.

⁷⁴ See Konstantyn Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917* (Milwaukee, 1958); Ohloblyn, *History of Ukrainian Industry*, esp. pt. 1: “Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabryki: Manufaktura v Getmanshchine” [originally published in Kiev in 1925]; idem, *Narysy z istorii ukrains'koi fabryky: Kripats'ka fabryka* (printed in Kharkiv and Kiev in 1931, then confiscated).

⁷⁵ See above, fn. 68.

⁷⁶ On the Ukrainian industrial region, see W. L. Blackwell, “The Historical Geography of Industry in Russia during the Nineteenth Century,” in *Studies in Russian Historical Geography* 2: 402–10.

⁷⁷ Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 93.

⁷⁸ On Berdychiv, see O. S. Chornobryvtseva, ed., *Zhytomyrs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1973), pp. 164–67; *REIU* 1 (1969): 123.

Novorossiiia became a colonial territory of the Russian Empire after the incorporation of the territories of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Crimean Khanate.⁷⁹ Economic leadership was soon assumed by the city of Odessa (built in 1794),⁸⁰ due to its extraterritorial status as a free port (since 1817). Until the 1860s Odessa's trade and commerce were dominated by Mediterranean merchants, mainly Greeks and Italians. Catherine II encouraged Jewish settlement in *Novorossiiia*. Jews flocked there both from the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and from Austrian Galicia. By 1828, 4,226 Jews lived in Odessa, or 12 percent of the city's total population at the time. By 1855 their number had increased to 17,000 (21 percent, including 477 merchants and families). By the 1840s most of the bankers and moneychangers in Odessa were Jewish, and during the early 1870s Jews took control of grain exports, Odessa's main trade commodity. The Greek response was the pogrom that took place in Odessa in the spring of 1871.

The Kingdom of Poland, in union with the Russian Empire through the person of its tsar, was the product of the Congress of Vienna (1815). As a result of the initiative and vision of the kingdom's finance minister, Count Ksawery Lubecki-Drucki, the relatively small ethnic Polish lands, which had never before excelled in economic affairs, suddenly developed greater economic prowess than the immense Russian Empire.⁸¹ By the mid-1880s, the Kingdom of Poland was producing one-fifth of all the empire's textiles, one quarter of its steel, two-fifths of its coal, and one-fifth of its sugar. Half the Polish production was sold in the empire, mainly in the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and in *Novorossiiia*.⁸² This development took place because Lubecki-Drucki, taking advantage of the Kingdom's status as a free-trade zone, encouraged foreign investors, mainly Germans (including many German Jews) and Frenchmen, and made daring use of West European technology and know-how. Thus, he established in 1828 in Warsaw the first State Bank in Eastern Europe. Within a few years this comprehensive economic program turned Congress Poland into the most industrialized country in continental Europe, second only to England.

⁷⁹ On the colonization of *Novorossiiia*, see Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800-1825 gg.*; idem, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma 1825-1860 gg.*

⁸⁰ On Odessa, see L. V. Hladka, ed., *Odes'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1969), pp. 85–102; *REIU* 3 (1971): 264–65; Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794-1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).

⁸¹ Mieczysław Ajzen, *Polityka gospodarcza Lubeckiego (1821-1830)* (Warsaw, 1932). See also the English version of the classic study by Rosa Luxemburg, *The Industrial Development of Poland* (New York, 1977); I. I. Ianzhul, *Istoričeskii očerok razvitiia fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti v Tsarstve Pol'skom* (Moscow, 1888); I. Edlickii, "Gosudarstvennaia promyshlennost' v Tsarstve Pol'skom v XIX v.," in *Genesis kapitalizma i promyshlennosti* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 278–304. See also W. L. Blackwell, "Historical Geography," pp. 390–96.

⁸² Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 66.

Soon the Kingdom's Jewish urban masses (in 1841 numbering 179,000, or 40 percent of the total urban population)⁸³—newly emancipated, following the German *maskilim* (“enlighteners”), with whom they now entered into economic cooperation—took part in these exciting ventures. By 1897 Jews accounted for 73 percent of all those engaged in trade and industry in the Kingdom of Poland which by 1880 was steadily expanding into the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and Novorossia.⁸⁴ Herein lies clear motivation for the Moscow merchants to resent Jewish economic activities in the Ukraine.

IX

From the 1840s, Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov was active in Moscow as a journalist, administrator, duma member, Moscow entrepreneur, and, interestingly, student of the Ukrainian markets.⁸⁵ His role in the militant Slavophile movement was unique: he was not a theoretician, but an eminent practitioner who, as a pan-Slavist crusader, enjoyed tremendous popularity.⁸⁶

After his death in 1886, Aksakov's friends and admirers in Moscow collected and published his numerous articles in seven volumes. Volume three of the collection is entitled “The Polish Question and West Russian Affairs: The Jewish Question, 1860-1886.”⁸⁷ The articles were originally published in the Moscow journals *Den'*, *Moskva*, *Moskvich*, and *Rus'*.

Connecting the Polish question with the Jewish question and the dates 1860 to 1886 were certainly not accidental. “Aksakov,” writes Stephen Lukashovich, “at first, linked the Jewish problem with the problem of Polonism in the western region: [according to Aksakov, O. P.] the Poles were both exploiters and invaders of Russian nationality; the Jews were leeches who weakened the population by draining their economic vitality, thus creating favorable conditions for Polonization.”⁸⁸

⁸³ *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, 15, col. 745.

⁸⁴ *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, 15, col. 757. See Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 185.

⁸⁵ It was Ivan Aksakov who wrote the basic description of the fairs (*iarmarki*) in the Ukraine: *Issledovanie o torgovle na ukrainskikh iarmarkakh* (St. Petersburg, 1858). On this figure see Stephen Lukashovich, *Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

⁸⁶ S. Vengerov, *Kritiko-biograficheskii slovar' russkikh pisatelei i uchenykh*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1889), 335–36.

⁸⁷ *Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova*, vol. 3: *Pol'skii vopros i zapadnorusskoe delo: Evreiskii vopros. 1860-1886* (Moscow, 1886).

⁸⁸ Lukashovich, *Aksakov*, pp. 96–97.

Aksakov illustrated what he considered to be the rapaciousness of Jewish exploitation in forceful, vivid, and virulent terms. Struggle against exploitation became the main slogan of his anti-Jewish propaganda. Aksakov wrote:

One finds in the western provinces a degree of exploitation that cannot be compared to the exploitation of the worker by any factory-owner or landowner. There, [Jewish] exploitation, like a boa, is strangulating the population. It drains all the blood of the people and keeps them fettered in such a horrible bondage that no worker or peasant in Jew-free Russia can have an idea about it. . . . It is so much more insulating because the exploiters belong to another race and another creed.⁸⁹

Aksakov's reaction to the pogroms of 1881 speaks for itself. In an article devoted to those events, he had not a word of compassion for the victims. "The man," he wrote, "who has visited even once our southern and western border provinces. . . [the Ukraine], where Jews live unhampered, and who has seen with his own eyes the oppression of the local Russian [Ukrainian] population by Jewry (we have been there many times) will know that the popular movement [sic!—O. P.] is not only natural, but even quite unsurprising."⁹⁰

It is in Aksakov's Moscow circles that one can seek out the ideologists who stimulated the Moscow and St. Petersburg merchants to organize the "spontaneous," popular anti-Jewish pogroms in the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and Novorossiiia in 1881.⁹¹

The pogrom in Odessa, masterminded by that city's Greek merchants, had occurred in the spring of 1871. The timing of the pogroms of 1881 was perhaps not accidental: it marked the tenth anniversary of the Odessa pogrom, and it had the same economic-religious background. One plausible hypothesis is that the Moscow merchants followed in the footsteps of

⁸⁹ English translation quoted in Lukashevich, *Aksakov*, p. 97.

⁹⁰ I. Aksakov, "'Liberal' po povodu rozgroma Evreev" (*Rus'*, June 1881), in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1886), p. 719. Aksakov's work was continued by a symbolic duo, the Moscow merchant D. I. Morozov and the nobleman Prince D. N. Tsereteli. The latter was editor of *Russkoe obozrenie*, financed by the former. About that journal Rieber writes: "The journal championed the demands of Moscow's economic interests against all foreign and ethnic competitors along the periphery from the Pacific Maritime provinces to Persia and the Balkans. Its favorite targets were what was called 'the Lodzist nest' [referring to the Polish industrial city of Łódź] and 'the aggressive Jewish-Germany enemy.' Anti-semitic polemics reached a new height, culminating in such provocative comments as 'the Jews are stronger than the law.'" Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 185.

⁹¹ An Odessa rabbi stated clearly in his memo to Kutaisov that the Russian merchants were the main instigators of the pogroms in 1881; Admoni, pp. 299–300. See also Rybys'nyi, p. 179.

their Greek merchant co-religionists.⁹² To implement their ugly “program” they employed roving bands of seasonal railroad workers, mostly from the Russian guberniias,⁹³ the incipient proletariat.

Harvard University

⁹² Mykhalevych notes in his diary the connection between the pogroms of Odessa and Elisavetgrad. Rybys'kyi, p. 179.

⁹³ This has already been detected by Goldberg, pp. 22–23, 38–39: “Resümierend ist zu sagen, daß judenfeindliche Intentionen vornehmlich der russischen Bourgeoisie für den Ausbruch der Pogrome von großer Bedeutung waren. . . .” (p. 23).

Abbreviations used in the appendix

c	= celler (of wine and/or whiskey)
d.	= <i>derevnia</i> (village)
dnl	= data not listed
E, W, N, S	= the cardinal points (usually from Elisavetgrad)
g.	= <i>gorod</i> (town/townlet)
h	= house(s)
inh.	= inhabitants
KO	= <i>Kirovohrads'ka oblast'</i> , ed. D. S. Syvolap (Kiev, 1972)
m.	= <i>mestechko</i> (formerly privately owned town/townlet)
MO	= <i>Mykolaiivs'ka oblast'</i> , ed. V. O. Vasyl'iev (Kiev, 1971)
mp	= movable property
obl.	= <i>oblast'</i>
OO	= <i>Odes'ka oblast'</i> , L. V. Hladka (Kiev, 1969)
Orth.	= Orthodox-Christian
s.	= <i>selo/selenie</i> (large village)
sh	= shop(s)
t	= tavern(s)
v.	= <i>volost'</i> (rural district)

Note to the map

The map of the Elisavetgrad-centered pogroms and disturbances (1881) is based on the map in *KO*, pp. 8–9.

In the documents published by Krasnyi-Admoni, the names of localities are often misspelled, making their identification and localization difficult. Examples:

2. misspelled Cherliakovk- (p. 23);
6. misspelled Poliktarovk- (p. 23);
7. misspelled Sisovk- (p. 477);
8. incorrectly named Semenovka (p. 530);
8. misspelled Dolivovk- (p. 477);
20. misspelled Kamenovodk- (p. 249);
24. misspelled Boeraki (p. 23);
25. misspelled Mardevk- (p. 478);
27. misspelled Adzanka (p. 5); Adzhlik (p. 23);
28. misspelled Krasik-Iar (p. 23);
32. misspelled Dolin-Kalilik- (p. 23), Dolina-Kamenka (p. 530);
34. misspelled Kalinovka (p. 530);
44. misspelled Strunov- (p. 256);
45. incorrectly named Berezovka (p. 530).

Appendix: List of Places with Disturbances
with Evaluation of Damages (in rubles)

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh t and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
I. Elisavetgrad City								
1 Elisavetgrad, Kherson guberniia; 1881: 43,299 pop.; Jews 13,000	Kirovohrad; oblast' center; KO, pp. 81-124		15-17 April	1		418 290	1,938,209 (mp 1,897,077)	1-6, 20-26, 28, 31, 34, 226-32, 241-86, 299-301, 316, 468- 79, 530, 536-37
II. Elisavetgrad Uezd								
2 Cherniakovka, d., Oboznovka v. 838 Orth.	Cherniakhivka, Kiro- vohrad raion; KO, p. 366, map p. 329	4.3 S	night 16-17 April			4 (incl. 1 man- sion)	1 6,500 (mp 2,117)	23, 24, 249 fn. 1, 474- 75, 477, 530
3 Lelekovka, s., Oboznovka v., Rail- road station; 3,540 pop.; Orth. 3,510, other 10	Lelekvka, Kirovohrad raion; KO, p. 349, map p. 329	5.3 W	17 April			3	6 3,120	23, 249 fn. 1, 474-75, 477, 530
4 Sazonovka, d., Oboznovka v.; less than 500 inh.	Sazonivka, Kirovohrad raion; KO, p. 349, map p. 329; Vysoki Bairaky	7.5 W	17 April				1 400	475
5 Gruzskoe, s., v. center; 4,216 pop.; Orth. 4,132, other 84	Hruz'ke, Kirovohrad raion; KO, p. 361, map p. 329	18 W	17 April			2 4	2 4,100	23, 249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavegrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh t and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
6 Pokitarovka, d., Vladimirovka v.; 1881: 24 houses; 1897: less than 500 inh.	Pokitarivka, Kirovohrad raion; KO, p. 364, map p. 329; Osytniazhka	21.2 NW	17 April			1 1 1	1,752	23, 177-81, 249 fn. 1, 250, 278, 280, 475, 477, 530
7 Sasovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; 984 Orth.	Sasivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, p. 380, map p. 367; Hubivka	21.2 SE	17 April			1	4,086	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
8 Zelenovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Zelene, Kompaniivka raion; KO, p. 380, map p. 367; Lozuvatka	20 SE	18 April			2	320	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
9 Grigor'evka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Hryhorivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, nl	31.8 SW	18 April			1	460	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
10 Egorovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Iehorivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, nl	31.8 SE	18 April			1	500	249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
11 Aleksandrovka, d., Nechaevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Oleksandrivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, nl	45 SW	18 April				dnl	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530
12 Pustopol'e, d., Nechaevka v.; 568 Orth.	?, Kompaniivka raion; KO, nl	45 SW	19 April			1	300	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni. pp.
13 Rostovka, d., Nechaevka v.; less than 500 inh.	?, Kompaniivka raion; KO, nl	45 SW	19 April				50	475
14 Petrovka, d., Lozovatka v.; less than 500 inh.	Petrivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, p. 382, map p. 367	46 SE	20 April			1	100	475
15 Miroljubovka, g., Erdelievka v.; 917 pop.; Orth. 897; other 20	Kirovka, Mala Vyska raion; KO, p. 411, map p. 384	81 W	20 April				dnl	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530
16 Vitiizevka, m., Vitiizevka v.; 687 pop.; Orth. 637; other 50	Vytiiazivka, Bobrynets' raion; KO, pp. 138-45, map p. 125	77 SW	21 April			4 3 3	5,536	23, 24, 177, 249, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475-77, 530
17 Katerinovka, d., Vitiizevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Katerynivka, Bobrynets' raion; KO, nl	87 SW	21 April				700	476
18 Antonopol' Antonovka, d., Bratskoe v.; less than 500 inh.	Antonopol', Mykolaiv obl., Brats'ke raion; MO, p. 285, map p. 256	ca. 90 SW	21 April				dnl	249, 249 fn. 1, 475-76, 530
19 Gavrilentov Khutor, Bratskoe v.; less than 500 inh.	?, Mykolaiv oblast', Brats'ke raion; MO, nl	ca. 95 SW	21 April			1	250	476

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
20 Kamenovatka, d., Bratskoe v.; 593 Orth.	Kam''ianuvatka, Mykolaiv obl.; Brats'ke raion; <i>MO</i> , p. 256	ca. 100 SW	21 April					1	683	249, 249 fn. 1, 476-77, 530
TOTAL (without Elisavetgrad)			16/17- 21 April			12 (incl. 1 man- sion)	11	23	28,857	
III. Alexandria Uezd										
21 Aleksandriia, g., uezd center; 1881: 15,980 pop.; Jews 4,794	Oleksandriia, center of raion; <i>KO</i> , pp. 600-19	75 NE	19 April			1	1		600	24, 252 fn. 1, 479-80, 495, 530
22 Znamenka, Railroad station; 1,055 pop.; Orth. 1,013; other 42	Znam''ianka, center of raion; <i>KO</i> , pp. 286-305	40 NE	17 April			4 (incl. 1 hotel)	1	1	10,300	5, 23, 252, 478, 530
23 Malaia Mamaika, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; 590 Orth.	Mala Mamaika, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , p. 349, map p. 329	10.6 NE	night 16/17 April					1	260	23, 477-78, 530
24 Vysokie Bueraki, s., center of v.; less than 500 inh.; 1972: 921 pop.	Vysoki Bairaky, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , pp. 349-59, map p. 329	12 N	night 16/17 April					2	440	23, 477-78, 530

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh and t t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
25 Mar'evka, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; less than 500 inh.	Mar'iiivka, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , p. 349, map p. 329	ca. 11 N	17 April			1	383	23, 253, 478, 530
26 Aleksandrovka, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; less than 500 inh.	? Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , nl	ca. 12 N	17 April			1	383	23, 478, 530
27 Adzhamka, s., center of v.; 9,745 pop.; Orth. 9,458, other 287	Adzhamka, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , pp. 329-40	21 E	17 April			1	86	5, 23,479,530
28 Krasnyi Iar, s., Adz- hamka v.; 2,077 pop.; Orth. 793, Old Believ- ers 1,284	Chervonyi Iar, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , p. 366, map p. 329	26 E	17 April		1		1,581	23, 479, 530
29 Klyntsy, s., Adzhamka v.; 2,690 pop.; Orth. 1,333, Old Believers 1,353, other 4	Klyntsy, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , pp. 361-62, map p. 329	12 S	17 April		4		1,867	23, 253, 479, 530
30 Subbottsy, s., Adz- hamka v.; 3,828 pop.; Orth. 3,795, other 33	Subbottsi, Znam'iianka raion; <i>KO</i> , p. 327, map p. 286	28 NE	17 April				no dam- age	479, 530
31 Pokrovskoe, s., Adz- hamka v.; 3,267 pop.; Orth. 3,263, other 4	Pokrovs'ke, Kirov. raion; <i>KO</i> , p. 365, map p. 329	16 SE	17 April				no dam- age	479, 530

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh t and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
32 Donina Kamianka, s., Kazarnia v.; 799 Orth.	Donyo-Kam''ianka, Znam''ianka raion; KO, p. 327, map p. 286	ca. 20 N	18 April			1	3,316 (mp 2,629)	23, 477, 479, 530
33 Gubovka, s., Novgo- rodka v.; 5,287 pop.; Orth. 5,251, other 36	Hubivka, Kompaniivka raion; KO, p. 380, map p. 367	30 SE	18 April			4	1,661	479, 530
34 Kamenka, s., Novgo- rodka v.; 5,174 pop.; Orth. 5,093, other 81	Inhula-Kam''ianka, Novhorodka raion; KO, pp. 447-48, map p. 425	ca. 50 SE	18 April			5	173	479, 530
35 Ploskoe, s., Krasnosel'e v.; 1,396 pop.; Orth. 1,373, other 23	Ploske, Znam''ianka raion; KO, p. 311, map p. 286	ca. 60 NE	19 April				16	479, 530
TOTAL			16/17- 19 April			20 3 7	20,683	
IV. Anan'ev Uezd								
36 Golta, s., Railroad sta- tion; 7,062 pop.; Orth. 5,307, Jews 1,245, other 510	(Holta) Pervomais'k, Mykolaiv obl., raion center; MO, pp. 654-72	ca. 135 SW	17 April			34 19 5 (incl. 3 c)	45,846	14, 24, 254, 280-81, 480-81, 530, 538-39

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h sh t and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
37 Anan'ev, center of v., g.; 1881: 15,220 pop.; Jews 7,650	Anan'iv, Odesa oblast', raion center; <i>OO</i> , pp. 139-58	ca. 190 SW	26-27 April			164 14 19 (incl. 8 c)	38,498	14, 26, 34, 91-92, 254- 55, 481-82, 487, 495, 538-39
38 Berezovka, bez'uezdnyi gorod; 6,154 pop.; Orth. 2,461, Jews 3,458, other 235	Berezivka, Odesa oblast', raion center; <i>OO</i> , pp. 249-59	ca. 220 SWS	26-27 April		2	159 17 11 c.	450,000	14, 26, 91- 92, 255-57, 482-83, 487, 530, 538, 539
39 Gandrabury, s.; 4,845 pop.; Orth. 4,817, other 28	Handrabury, Odesa oblast', Anan'iv raion; <i>OO</i> , p. 180, map p. 139	7 W from Anan'ev	27 April			5	3,450	92, 255, 484, 530
40 Romanovka, m.; less than 500 inh.	Romanivka, Odesa oblast', Anan'iv raion; <i>OO</i> , p. 182, map p. 139; Shymkove	16 SE from Anan'ev	27 April				dnl	92
41 Zavadvovka, d., 1,404 pop.; Orth. 1,315, other 89	Zavodivka, Odesa oblast', Berezivka raion; <i>OO</i> , pp. 279-80, map p. 249	9 NW from Berezovka	27 April			4 1	7,000	92, 256, 484, 530
42 Tefulova, d.; less than 500 inh.	?, <i>OO</i> , nl	ca. 30 from Berezovka	28 April			2	1,300	92, 256, 484, 530

1881 Form of Name Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed hsh and t			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
43 Sirotnika, d.; less than 500 inh.	Syrotynka, Odesa oblast', Mykolaivka raion; OO, p. 683, map p. 662; Petrivka	ca. 27 NW from Bere- zovka	28 April			2			351	256, 484, 530
44 Strukovo, s.; 535 Orth.	Strukove, Odesa oblast', Mykolaivka raion; OO, p. 683, map p. 662; Petrivka	32 SW from Berezovka	28 April			1			330	256, 484, 530
TOTAL			26-28 April		2	371	50	40 (incl. 12 c)	546,775	
V. Tiraspol' uezd										
45 Bernardovka/Berezovka, d.; less than 500 inh.	? Moldavian SSR		27 April				2	2 (incl. 1 c)	9,100	256-57, 484, 530, 538
46 Demidovo, s.; less than 500 inh.	? Moldavian SSR		27 April					1	100	257, 484, 530
TOTAL			27 April				2	3 (incl. 1 c)	9,200	

1881 Nameform and Administrative No. Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed hsh and t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
VI. Odessa Uezd								
47 Shpeier, s.; 2,135 pop.; Roman Cath. 1,983, other 197	? Odessa oblast'; OO, nl		4, 6 May			1	14	93, 485, 487, 530; cf. 539
48 Varvarovka/Mikhailovka, m.; 2,352 pop.; Orth. 1,562, Jews 781	Varvarivka, Odessa oblast', Ivanivka raion; OO, p. 32, map p. 412		10 May			1	80	485, 487, 530; cf. 539
TOTAL			4-10 May			2	94	
GRAND TOTAL (Kherson gubernia)			15 April – 10 May	1	2	823 (incl. 2 man-sions and 1 hotel)	2,543,818	



