



The President and Fellows of Harvard College

The Holodomor: A Prologue to Repressions and Terror in Soviet Ukraine

Author(s): Yuri Shapoval and Marta D. Olynyk

Source: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1/4, AFTER THE HOLODOMOR: THE ENDURING IMPACT OF THE GREAT FAMINE ON UKRAINE (2008), pp. 99-121

Published by: [Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23611468>

Accessed: 05/10/2014 17:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and The President and Fellows of Harvard College are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Holodomor: A Prologue to Repressions and Terror in Soviet Ukraine

YURI SHAPOVAL

THE TRADITION OF RESEARCHING the catastrophic famine in Soviet Ukraine we call the Holodomor was launched and consolidated during the last years of Communist Party rule in Ukraine. The year 1990 saw the publication of a collection of documents entitled *The Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Through the Eyes of Historians, in the Language of Documents*.¹ The second part of this collection contains unique and fundamentally important party documents on the Holodomor that had never been published before.

These efforts continued and intensified with the achievement of independence in 1991 and the introduction of post-Soviet institutions, including the presidency. But neither during the terms in office of Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk (1991–94) nor Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) were so many previously inaccessible documents on the Holodomor published as during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–10).

In the summer of 2006 a number of documents stored at the Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (HDA SBU) were declassified. These documents pertain to the Famine of 1932–33, and for many decades access to them was strictly forbidden. Some of these documents and related materials were published in a scholarly publication entitled *Declassified Memory: The Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine in GPU-NKVD Documents*, which has already appeared in two editions.² The declassification process continued in 2008, and that year GPU documents became accessible to historians. These materials, which mostly focus on the activities of foreign diplomatic missions in the Ukrainian SSR, consist of directives and certain operational documents issued by Soviet security services.

These declassified documents shed light on the true situation in the Ukrainian countryside, the demands of the party-state structures and the GPU's efforts to implement them, the Soviet government's efforts to conceal information on the fundamental nature and scale of the Holodomor, the mood of the population, and the implementation of various repressive measures.

Archival sources, including the newly declassified documents mentioned above, provide grounds for linking the Holodomor in Ukraine with the repressive policies of the Stalinist regime, a system that took advantage of the famine situation in order to intensify its repressive activities in the post-Holodomor years.

THE GPU MOBILIZE

In November 1931 a document issued by the General Consulate of Germany in Kharkiv noted:

The state police is the strong arm of the party and at the same time a government organ. Until now in Ukraine it has been headed by the energetic [Vsevolod] Balyts'kyi, who was transferred to Moscow this year to take up a position as one of [Viacheslav] Menzhinskii's deputies. Until recently his successor [Stanislav] Redens, a native of Galicia, has had a low profile. With no less fervor than in previous years, during the past year the GPU has also sought to safeguard the security of the state by methods that it considers correct and well-tried, first and foremost by mercilessly persecuting and punishing all suspicious attempts to carry out a coup d'état.³

Notwithstanding the measures that were already being implemented, in August 1932 Stalin wrote a letter to Lazar Kaganovich expressing his dissatisfaction with Redens's activities and suggesting that Balyts'kyi be dispatched to the Ukrainian SSR to head the GPU or named the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU, with the proviso that he retain his position as deputy head of the OGPU of the USSR.⁴ However, Stalin's instruction was implemented gradually: on 25 November 1932 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CC AUCP[b]) passed a resolution appointing Balyts'kyi—in recognition of his “great experience in Ukrainian work”—the special OGPU plenipotentiary in Ukraine, to whom Redens and the entire apparatus of the security service of the Ukrainian SSR were to be subordinated.⁵ Balyts'kyi was instructed to submit brief reports to the CC AUCP(b) about the work of the Ukrainian GPU after every two ten-day periods.⁶ Thus, the security service in Ukraine had two bosses—a formal one, Redens, and a real one, Balyts'kyi. It is more than likely that Balyts'kyi obtained special instructions and recommendations from Stalin. Proof of this may be found in the visitors' book, in which were recorded the names of people who were received by Stalin. According to this book, Balyts'kyi had an audience with the General Secretary two times in November 1932, on the 15th and the 24th.⁷

In strengthening the security service's structure in Ukraine, Stalin did not neglect the republic's highest political leadership. Stalin's letter of 11 August 1932 and others that he wrote to Kaganovich contain crushing assessments of Stanislav Kosior, Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi, and Vlas Chubar. Thus, it is no accident that, in addition to Balyts'kyi, Stalin dispatched his henchmen Viacheslav Molotov (who would head the Extraordinary Grain Procurement Commission), Kaganovich, and Pavel Postyshev, to the Ukrainian SSR. All three men were officially appointed special plenipotentiaries of the CC AUCP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the USSR by a special joint decision handed down on 19 December 1932.⁸ Their task was to direct the Ukrainian leaders, but in fact they were an alternative local center of political power and influence. All of Stalin's emissaries were advocates of pressure methods, and they were convinced a priori that there was secret resistance in Ukraine that had to be liquidated by means of repressive measures.

That was also Balyts'kyi's conviction. He advised his subordinates of the "organized sabotage of the state grain deliveries and the fall sowing, organized mass thefts on collective farms and Soviet state farms, terror against the staunchest and most steadfast communists and activists in the countryside, the deployment of dozens of Petliurite emissaries, [and] the dissemination of Petliurite leaflets."⁹ His finding was "the categorical existence in Ukraine of an organized, counterrevolutionary, insurgent underground, which is linked to foreign countries and foreign intelligence services, mainly the Polish General Staff."¹⁰

On 26 November 1932 the Soviet Ukrainian press published an order issued by the People's Commissar of Justice and the Prosecutor-General of the Ukrainian SSR that emphasized that repression was a powerful tool in overcoming class resistance to the state grain deliveries. According to the order, merciless measures could now be implemented against the kulaks and all "class enemies" who were wrecking or hindering the successful struggle for grain. At this time the GPU had already launched a "mass operation to inflict a surgical strike against the class enemy," the goal of which was to "expose counterrevolutionary centers that are organizing sabotage and wrecking the state grain deliveries and other agricultural-political measures." This operation encompassed 243 raions in the Ukrainian SSR.¹¹

Between August and November 1932, GPU organs alone indicted a total of 21,197 people: 1,491 people (7 percent of the total number indicted) in August; 2,526 (11.9 percent) in September; 2,850 (13.4 percent) in October; and 14,330 (67.7 percent) in November.¹² As these statistics indicate, the repressions escalated significantly during the month of November, when the work of the Extraordinary Commission to squeeze out grain began to intensify. Of the individuals who were subjected to repressions, 32.7 percent were accused of stealing, squandering, and concealing grain, while 30.4 percent were charged

with conducting agitation against the state grain deliveries. The rest of the indictments pertained to grain speculation, resistance to the confiscation of grain, actions targeting the state grain deliveries, and criticism of the government's policies.¹³ The largest proportion of arrestees consisted of independent farmers (middle peasants), while those who were branded as kulaks comprised 16.8 percent of those arrested.¹⁴

Balyts'kyi resolved to intensify the repressions. On 5 December 1932 he issued Operational Order of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Number 1, which obliged his subordinates to carry out the "fundamental and main task—the urgent breakthrough, exposure, and rout of the counterrevolutionary insurgent underground, and the infliction of a decisive strike at all counterrevolutionary kulak-Petliurite elements that are actively counteracting and wrecking the basic measures of the Soviet authorities and the party in the countryside."¹⁵

To assist in the implementation of this order, a special Shock-Operational Group was formed, headed by Karl Karlson, deputy chief of the OGPU of the Ukrainian SSR. Later, in a letter awarding Karlson a bonus, Balyts'kyi wrote:

In 1932–1933 Com[rade] Karlson personally directed the investigation into the case of counterrevolutionary organizations in Ukraine's agriculture (the "Kondensator-Nezadovilni" case). As a result of the energetic and able development of the investigation, a powerful counterrevolutionary insurgent and wreckers' organization, whose influence extended to 133 raions in Ukraine, was exposed and liquidated. The organization numbered up to 3,000 members and had its counterrevolutionary centers in 114 collective farms, 102 MTSs [Machine Tractor Stations], [and] 167 raion centers of Ukraine. The counterrevolutionary organization had links with foreign countries and with the Moscow counterrevolutionary center, and was actively preparing an uprising in the spring of 1933.¹⁶

During the "operation in the countryside," in one month alone (15 November–15 December 1932) oblast divisions of the GPU arrested nearly 16,000 people, with Soviet security organs playing a direct role in the searches for concealed grain.¹⁷ On 20 December Balyts'kyi reported that during two ten-day periods in December GPU personnel, state grain delivery officials, and local activists discovered 7,000 pits and 100 illegal storehouses, in which they found 11,340 tons of grain.¹⁸ According to Balyts'kyi, "large insurgent groups of Polish origin, organized by the government of the UNR [the pre-Soviet Ukrainian National Republic]" were discovered. In addition, former members of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP), which had been liquidated by the Bolsheviks, members of the CP(b)U, students and lecturers of Kyivan institutions of higher education, and employees of the Tractor Center were arrested, and the operations of 589 groups that "were sabotaging the

state grain deliveries and destabilizing the collective farms” were exposed on collective farms.¹⁹

Balyts'kyi described the secret police actions in the countryside thus:

In the last two to three days we applied a new type of pressure in the Kharkiv region. A uniformed OGPU official arrives at a collective farm and has a conversation with the head [and] the members of the administration about delivering grain. The conversation is forceful. As a result, within two days the 'Red Farmer' collective farm has raised its grain delivery from 58 percent of the plan to 96 percent, the New Life [collective farm]—from 54 percent to 80 percent, etc. We plan on expanding this to other oblasts.²⁰

One can only imagine the nature of this “forceful” conversation, which undoubtedly consisted of threats, pressure, and blackmail. Between November 1932 and January 1933 the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR liquidated 1,208 “counter-revolutionary” collective farm groups.²¹ Inspections encompassed Soviet state farms, the Zagotzerno (Grain Procurement) system, the consumer cooperation system, and others.

Therefore, in pursuing the government's harsh line on the grain requisitions, from the very outset the Soviet security organs ensured its implementation through specific methods. Still, this did not improve the situation in Ukraine, and the state grain delivery quotas for the Ukrainian SSR had to be reduced. Despite the reduction, by 1 December 1932 the republic had fulfilled only 63.1 percent of the plan. This set off a new wave of dissatisfaction in Moscow.

THE NEW WAVE

On 24 January 1933 the CC AUCP(b) approved a special resolution introducing personnel changes in the Bolshevik leadership of the Ukrainian republic. Pavel Postyshev, who was appointed second secretary of the CC CP(b)U, was ordered by the Stalinist leadership to find a way out of the situation that had emerged in connection with the famine; to overcome what was euphemistically dubbed “economic difficulties” and a “breakdown in the agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR.” Postyshev, who remained in control of Ukraine until early 1937 (owing to the perceived weakness of the head of the CC CP(b)U, Stanislav Kosior), accused the Ukrainians themselves—that is, “Ukrainian nationalists” and “Petliurites”—of having organized the famine. Those “nationalists” had to be exposed and liquidated. In this task Postyshev was assisted by his closest colleague, Balyts'kyi, who was officially appointed to head the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, in keeping with the above-mentioned resolution.

On 7 February 1933 the plenum of the CC CP(b)U held a special discussion of this Kremlin resolution, during which particular emphasis was laid on the fact that

from the very beginning of the state grain deliveries both the central oblast and raion leading party organs were insufficiently attentive; they overlooked and failed to expose in a timely fashion the maneuvers of the class enemy—the kulak, the Petliurite, the Makhnovite—who had crept into collective farms and occupied leading positions in a number of collective farms; they did not expose kulak concealment and kulak cleverness in the struggle against the state grain deliveries.²²

As noted above, together with Postyshev, Balyts'kyi was reappointed head of the Ukrainian GPU (his appointment was confirmed by the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) only on 17 February and by the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U on 18 February,²³ although he was already hard at work in his new position). According to German diplomats, it was Balyts'kyi who helped Postyshev introduce order “with an iron broom,” and throughout 1933 he “became the central figure in the political, economic, and cultural life of the Ukrainian republic, and acquired such great influence that he is, without a doubt, the most influential person in Ukraine trusted by Stalin—the Stalin of Ukraine.”²⁴

At the beginning of 1933 the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR stepped up its activities, which were facilitated by a resolution issued in January by the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) that created positions for deputy heads of political departments at MTSs and Soviet state farms who were staff members of the GPU. Order Number 0017 of the OGPU of the USSR, dated 25 January 1933, outlined their tasks, which included the struggle against “counterrevolutionary manifestations” at MTSs and Soviet state farms, the exposure of “counterrevolutionary and kulak groups,” the protection of socialist property, and the elucidation of the “political-moral and industrial-economic situation at MTSs and Soviet state farms.”²⁵

Although deputy heads of political departments at MTSs or Soviet state farms were subordinated to their chiefs, they enjoyed complete independence in their operational work. This led to a huge upsurge in the repressive activities of the Soviet security organs, which forced the government to react. On 8 May 1933 a special instruction circulated locally by the CC AUCP(b) and the Sovnarkom of the USSR condemned the “mass unregulated arrests” in the countryside and emphasized that the “mass arrests and repressions in the countryside are clearly becoming politically harmful and dangerous.”²⁶

On 6 February the CC AUCP(b) issued a special resolution suspending the state grain delivery campaign in Ukraine until the end of the sowing period.²⁷ From the 1932 harvest 260.7 million poods of grain were shipped

out of Ukraine, of which 217.9 million poods came from collective farms and independent farmers. Collective farms and independent homesteads in only two Ukrainian oblasts, Vinnytsia and Kyiv, managed to fulfill the grain delivery quotas (reduced in October 1932).²⁸

By this point, it was no longer a question of confiscating grain, and the GPU shifted its accents accordingly. On 13 February 1933 Balyts'kyi issued Order Number 2, On the Current Tasks of the Intelligence-Operational Work of the GPU Organs of the Ukrainian SSR, which noted that "the analysis of closed cases indicates that in the matter at hand we encountered a single thoroughly developed plan to organize an armed uprising in Ukraine by the spring of 1933 with the goal of toppling the Soviet government and establishing a capitalist state, the so-called Ukrainian Independent Republic." At the same time, Balyts'kyi assigned the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR "the immediate, fundamental, and chief task...of ensuring the spring sowing."²⁹

In order to carry out this order, raion divisions of the GPU were relieved of "unpromising cases" and provided with personnel who were sent from oblast divisions of the GPU. The personnel of special departments were dispatched to raions where "insurgents and spies" were supposedly operating, while employees of economic departments were sent to industrial districts with large Soviet state farms. Staff members of secret-political departments were dispatched to all other raions.

In early 1933 the Soviet authorities announced that a "counterrevolutionary organization in the agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR" had been exposed. It was swiftly linked to counterrevolutionary organizations in Moscow, Rostov, and Minsk. Among those accused of belonging to this fictitious organization were T. Beliaiev, an agronomist employed at the Kyiv-based enterprise Obltraktor; A. Holovko, the chief editor of the All-Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Correspondence Courses; A. Honcharenko, an agronomist employed at the Ukrovoshchtraktorotsentr enterprise; F. Kyiashko, an agronomist working in the planning sector of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR; O. Man'kivs'kyi, the administrator of the Odesa Oblast Grain Administration; I. Pasichnyk, the head of a group at the Dnipropetrovsk-based enterprise, Obltraktor; S. Fomenko, the senior administrator of the planning directorate at the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR; I. Shabanov, a scientist at the Odesa Selection Institute; and I. Babak, I. Zinchenko, O. Ponomarenko, and I. Rodzevych, all agronomists employed by Ukrtraktorotsentr.

In Moscow the arrested Ukrainian specialists were also "implicated" in the case of an all-Union counterrevolutionary organization in agriculture, whose goal was "to undermine agriculture and cause a famine in the country." On 11 March 1933 the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR handed down death sentences to thirty-five members of this organization, which was allegedly headed by the former deputy Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR, the

Galician-born Fedir Konar. An announcement about this was published in *Pravda* on 12 March.³⁰

On 10 March 1933 the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) issued a resolution stating: "Grant the *troika* consisting of comrades Balyts'kyi, Karlson, [and] Izraïl Leplevs'kyi the right to examine cases of insurgency and counterrevolution in Ukraine with the application of the highest degree of social protection."³¹ Together with Postyshev, Balyts'kyi traveled to all the starving districts of Ukraine, implementing harsh measures everywhere they set foot. Later Balyts'kyi told a group of his close associates that he and Postyshev had been dispatched to save Ukraine, which had been brought to wrack and ruin during his absence.³²

In a speech delivered at the second Donetsk oblast party conference held in January 1934, the head of the Ukrainian GPU described how this "rescue" had taken place. Balyts'kyi revealed that the need to eliminate the agricultural problems in the Ukrainian SSR had forced him "to purge Soviet state farms and collective farms of foreign and hostile elements and to review the leading raion cadres." During the first ten months of 1933, "237 raion party committee secretaries, 249 heads of raion executive committees, and 158 heads of raion control commissions were replaced by stronger personnel."³³

In the following years the attention of the Soviet security organs was also firmly focused on the situation in the Ukrainian countryside. For example, between December 1933 and January 1934 alone they liquidated eighty-five "counterrevolutionary kulak groups" based on Ukrainian collective farms, as a result of which nearly 400 individuals, mostly management personnel, were subjected to repressions.³⁴ A year later, on 21 February 1935, the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR issued a circular entitled "On Intelligence Work Pertaining to the Spring Sowing," to "embed an intelligence-information network in the countryside and at raion institutions in order to encompass all the crucial sowing areas."³⁵

On 16 February 1933 Soviet leaders issued a party-state directive categorically forbidding any organization, with the exception of the GPU, to record cases of starvation-related edema and death resulting from starvation. Rural councils were issued instructions not to list causes of death when they were registering deaths. In a letter sent to Stalin on 15 March 1933 Kosior not only took the liberty of making the blood-curdling comment that "starvation still has not taught very many collective farmers good sense,"³⁶ he also advised that the reports about the famine arriving from oblast party committees and the GPU were "completely contradictory."³⁷

The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR also applied stringent measures to prevent the mass departures of peasants who were fleeing Ukraine in search of bread. On 22 January 1933 Stalin and Molotov sent a directive to party and Soviet organs entitled "On the Prevention of Mass Departures of Starving Peasants

of Ukraine and the North Caucasus.” The order emphasized that the migration of starving peasants, which had begun as a direct result of the famine, was organized “by enemies of the Soviet government, S[ocialist] R[evolutionaries], and agents of Poland with the goal of agitating against collective farms and generally against the Soviet government ‘through the peasants’ in the northern raions of the USSR.”

In connection with this, the administrative organs and the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasus were ordered to prevent the mass exodus of peasants to other districts, and appropriate instructions were issued to the transport divisions of the OGPU of the USSR.³⁸

Following a decision of the central authorities in Moscow, on 23 January 1933 the CC CP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government issued a ban forbidding peasants to leave the Ukrainian SSR without permission. During the fall and winter of 1932–33 so-called food blockades were in effect, organized with the aid of interior troops and the militia. They blocked the peasants’ efforts to flee, thereby effectively ensuring that no information about the famine would trickle out. Furthermore, no private individuals were allowed to bring food products into Ukraine from Russia and Belarus without the government’s permission. Such a ban was never introduced in any other Soviet republic.

Besides carrying out repressions in Ukraine’s rural regions, in 1933–34 Soviet security organs also focused their efforts on reining in the Ukrainization process in Ukraine (instituted by the Bolsheviks themselves) by liquidating its nation-building potential, which was never again to be revived. Commenting on this, the German historian Gerhard Simon rightly noted: “Along with the ‘war’ against the peasantry, a war was being waged here against Ukrainian national self-identity.”³⁹

REPRESSIONS: THE SHIFT IN EMPHASIS

The one major factor that radically distinguished the situation in Ukraine from what was taking place, say, in Russia or Kazakhstan (where the mortality rate among Kazakhs due to starvation was very high) was the changes that were introduced into Soviet nationality policy. On 14 December 1932 Stalin and Molotov signed a resolution on state grain deliveries that was drafted by the CC AUCP(b) and the Sovnarkom of the USSR. Among other things, the document ordered the “correct implementation of Ukrainization” in Ukraine and beyond its borders—that is, in regions that were densely settled by ethnic Ukrainians. It also contained a categorical demand to wage a struggle against Petliurites and other “counterrevolutionary” elements.⁴⁰

This, in fact, determined the second vector of the actions that were launched by the Soviet security organs: the search for “nationalist counterrevolution”

not only in the countryside but also within the administrative links at all levels as well as among the intelligentsia. In December 1932 Soviet authorities began arresting people who were accused of being members of the “counterrevolutionary nationalistic ‘Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO),’ whose goal was allegedly to “overthrow Soviet power by means of an armed uprising and to create a fascist dictatorship in Ukraine.”⁴¹ Balyts’kyi was convinced that the UVO case deserved “the most serious attention” and that an “energetic, efficient pace” was required for the UVO’s “further liquidation and rout.”⁴²

In the spring of 1933 a “shock-investigative group” headed by Mikhail Aleksandrovskii, the chief of the Secret-Political Department of the Ukrainian GPU, was created for the sole purpose of investigating the UVO case. Such departments were formed in every oblast division of the GPU to expose the UVO. The UVO case dealt a destructive blow especially to emigrants from Galicia. In fact, an all-out witch hunt against Galicians was set in motion by Balyts’kyi’s order, which stated: “Pay special attention to ‘UVO’ members, who have crept into the party and arrived from abroad with fictitious party memberships from fraternal communist parties. As determined by the investigation, they are the most active organizers of the underground, espionage, and sabotage.”⁴³

The UVO may be called an “elastic” organization, because during the next few years its ranks were continuously expanded with alleged members. According to incomplete data, at least 148 people were sentenced in connection with this case in 1933–34 alone.⁴⁴

In 1933, in accordance with direct accusations of having organized the famine (which targeted people who clearly had done no such thing), 438 people were shot.⁴⁵ However, these are just the direct accusations. In fact, the number of people who were shot in Ukraine in 1933 requires clarification. According to a document issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR on 29 March 1934, a total of 1,141 people were executed in Ukraine in 1933. Of this number, 474 were executed by decision of the OGPU, 667 were executed by decision of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, and 5 people died prior to execution.⁴⁶ Another office note, dated 31 March 1934, indicates that during 1933, 805 people were shot by a decision issued by the troika under the Collegium of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR. Of this number, 615 people were executed following the investigation of their cases by the GPU’s territorial organs; 52 people, against whom cases had been opened by the transport organs, were shot; and 138 people were shot on the basis of cases opened against them by the organs of the militia.⁴⁷ This refutes the claims of some researchers who, for some reason, seek to diminish the repressive activities of the security service during the famine; Oleg Mozokhin and Teodor Gladkov, for example, argue that in 1933 the organs of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR sentenced 69 people to be shot.⁴⁸ However, for the sake of probity it should be noted that to this day official statistics have not received

their due attention, not because of researchers' lack of conscientiousness but because such data are often contradictory, "corrected," and concealed.

Attention must be directed to the fact that Soviet security services were also collecting and recording information on people who had simply talked about the Famine. This work, assigned to the GPU, became an especially important task, particularly in the wake of two widely publicized suicides whose shock-waves reverberated throughout Ukraine and beyond its borders: in May and July 1933, respectively, the Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvyl'ovyi and the former People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR Mykola Skrypnyk, who had been one of the most consistent supporters of the policy of Ukrainization, committed suicide.

The Ukrainian writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych was one of those on whom the GPU collected information in connection with the Famine. The case against him contains reports about his conversations and reflections on the horrific famine in Ukraine. For example, in July 1933 the writer made the following remarks to some friends with whom he was staying at the Writers' "House of Rest":

Owing to the fact that all foreign newspapers are filled with reports about the terrible famine in Ukraine as well as about the suicides of Skrypnyk and Khvyl'ovyi, Moscow has decided to throw dust in people's eyes, having tossed the Ukrainian peasants and workers a few million poods of the very grain that was confiscated from them, and to issue rations to Ukrainian writers and organize this vacation house. Stalin's insatiability and greed, which are boundless, have caused nearly 800,000 people to starve to death in Ukraine during the past spring. Now the party is seeking to dump the blame for this "Stalinist" error on some academicians and writers. The stupidity and futility of these measures are obvious to everyone.⁴⁹

In February 1934 Soviet security organs recorded another statement made by Antonenko-Davydovych: "At the present time there is no Ukrainian culture, and if there is, it is the corpse of Ukrainian culture because the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia and its culture are in exile. In order to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the West for the countless outrages in Ukraine, particularly for the death by starvation of four and a half million Ukrainians, the Soviet power is blaming Comrade Skrypnyk's nationality policy for everything."⁵⁰

Antonenko-Davydovych's remarks were an accurate assessment of the desperate situation in Ukraine. After having dealt with the Ukrainian peasants, the GPU launched a wave of repressions during 1933, targeting Ukrainian officials and intellectuals, especially those who had once belonged to other political

currents, parties, and movements. These repressive actions were aimed at destroying the nation-building potential, mentioned earlier, which later would be called euphemistically the “struggle against Skrypnykivshchyna,” the policies promoted by the former People’s Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR.

This struggle had begun, in fact, in February 1933, immediately after Skrypnyk was appointed the head of Gosplan for the Ukrainian SSR and the deputy head of Sovnarkom, the republic’s Council of People’s Commissars. Shortly afterwards, the newly appointed Commissar of Education, Volodymyr Zaton’s’kyi, became a member of the Ukrainian Politburo. A decision handed down on 23 February 1933 confirmed Andrii Khvyliia as the first deputy commissar of education of Ukraine. Khvyliia, who had once belonged to the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party and later the Borotbist Party, had gone over to the Bolsheviks, whom he served devotedly, earning a reputation for his energetic struggle against “national deviationism” in the mid-1920s.

On 24 April 1933 Khvyliia sent a memorandum on linguistic questions to the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U. This document was never published even though it was the first time Skrypnyk was openly accused of various shortcomings. Khvyliia wrote: “Not only did he not wage a struggle against...the bourgeois-nationalist line on the question of creating Ukrainian scholarly terminology, he also facilitated this distortion of the party line on the linguistic front.”

Before long the journal *Bil’shovyk Ukraïny* published Khvyliia’s lengthy article entitled “To Uproot, to Destroy the Nationalistic Roots on the Linguistic Front.” This blatantly vicious article contained the following conclusions: “(1) On the linguistic front we are witnessing wrecking work conducted by nationalistic Ukrainian elements. (2) This work has taken place according to the policy of separating the Ukrainian language from the Russian language, separating terminology, directing Ukrainian terminology onto bourgeois-nationalist paths. (3) In *Ukraïns’kyi pravopys* [Ukrainian Orthography], especially the third chapter, this separating of the Ukrainian language [and] terminology from the Russian language is now continued in orthographic form and with the adoption of foreign words. (4) The People’s Commissar of Education of Ukraine did not wage any kind of struggle against this work; on the contrary, he abetted this.”⁵¹

Khvyliia then proposed to put an immediate stop to the publication of all dictionaries; review existing dictionaries and all terminology; carry out unification of technical terminology with existing Soviet terminology (i.e., Russian); take a second look at the cadres working on the “linguistic front” and expel bourgeois-nationalist elements from this “front”; review Ukrainian orthography (the so-called Skrypnykite orthography was adopted in 1928); and change the linguistic design of the *Ukraïns’kaadians’ka entsyklopediia* (Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia). Finally, Khvyliia proposed “issuing a special document

that would encompass all these questions comprehensively and ensure the entire further development of Soviet Ukrainian culture on the linguistic front along truly Bolshevik pathways, just as Lenin taught this to us, as Comrade Stalin is teaching this to us.”⁵²

Khvyliia’s article was based on the speech that he had delivered at the April 1933 meeting of the CC CP(b)U, which was convened to discuss questions relating to nationality policy. This meeting was a general rehearsal for launching a broad attack on Skrypnyk’s policies. The meeting opened with a speech by Mykola Popov, third secretary of the CC CP(b)U, according to whom “hostile, foreign, Petliurite elements have even crept into leading positions in individual raions and into important areas of national-cultural construction.”⁵³

Volodymyr Zatons’kyi delivered a speech on the Communist Party’s nationality policy in schools. He emphasized in particular that the “drop in the number of schools of the Russian national minority is a consequence of the distortion of the party line.” Claiming that the ranks of workers in the field of education were “littered with nationalistic, class-enemy elements,” Zatons’kyi identified who was guilty: “These nationalistic elements were able to conduct their activities so broadly because they were helped by certain instructions of the People’s Commissar of Education himself.”⁵⁴

At the beginning of 1933 a criminal element, so to speak, was added to the political-ideological policy of “exposing” Skrypnyk. The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR advised that among the members of the UVO were individuals who were close to Skrypnyk—for example, Oleksandr Badan-Iavorenko, a professor at the Kharkiv Institute of Professional Education, and Mykhailo Ersteniuk, assistant to the academic secretary of Ukraine’s Commissariat of Education, and others.

In the hands of Postyshev, these kinds of GPU-fabricated documents became the very weapons with which he launched the decisive phase in the anti-Skrypnyk struggle at the CC CP(b)U plenum held on 8–11 June 1933. Skrypnyk’s speech failed to appease Postyshev, who made the following comment: “That area, which until recently was controlled by Comrade Skrypnyk—I mean the Commissariat of Education and the entire system of Ukraine’s educational bodies—turned out to be the most littered with wrecking, counterrevolutionary, nationalistic elements.... You, Comrade Skrypnyk, should have told us about this.”⁵⁵ In other words, Postyshev demanded that Skrypnyk slander himself by confessing that he had been involved in embedding “wreckers” and that later he too had engaged in “wrecking.”

On four different occasions in early summer 1933 (17 and 26 June; 5 and 7 July) the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U studied the versions of Skrypnyk’s document, in which he was supposed to have “exposed” his own mistakes. All the versions were deemed unsatisfactory. The following resolution was passed on 7 July 1933:

Considering:

- (1) that Comrade Skrypnyk did not carry out the task that he accepted to submit a brief letter to the CC with an acknowledgment of his mistakes and a decisive, full criticism of them for publication in the press;
- (2) that the document which he submitted does not meet the demands of the CC and ignores a number of instructions issued to Comrade Skrypnyk by the CC CP(b)U, this resolution must be submitted for confirmation by the plenum of the CC CP(b)U and the CC AUCP(b).⁵⁶

Realizing that he had been cornered, Skrypnyk left the session hall as soon as the discussions of his letter began. That same day, 7 July, he shot himself in his office. The Ukrainian writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who was living abroad at the time, reacted quickly to Skrypnyk's suicide. On 12 July 1933, he wrote in his notes:

Skrypnyk took his own life... (1) in order that his comrades in power would see that the nationality policy they were adopting was dangerous to the communist cause; (2) in order to cry out with his death against the brutality, stupid prattling, insolence, hypocrisy, inconsistency, and leadership "in the new course of the nationality policy"; (3) to provide with his death a slogan to other comrades who wish to be honest, sincere, consistent communists; in order to convince them that his policy was not erroneous, was not in the interests of his ambition, or advantages, or some other personal intentions. For what argument can be more convincing than death? ...I do not know whether those in power are still capable of hearing this scream, of sensing [this] warning? ...That will be shown by the future nationality policy of the Politburo of the AUCP in Ukraine.⁵⁷

Vynnychenko was correct in speaking about the "new course of the nationality policy" because at this very time efforts were underway to scale back the policy of "indigenization" (*korenizatsiia*)—meaning Ukrainization. Convincing proof of these efforts was the work of the joint plenum of the CC and the Central Control Commission of the CP(b)U, which took place on 18–22 November 1933. This plenum, the culminating point of the political campaign against so-called Skrypnykivshchyna, handed down a resolution stating that "at the present moment the main danger is local Ukrainian nationalism, which is uniting with imperialist interventionists."⁵⁸

The main target of the anti-Skrypnyk campaign was, first and foremost,

the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR and the entire system of culture, education, and scholarship. According to Postyshev's report presented at the joint plenum, "more than two thousand individuals, nationalistic elements, were expelled from the People's Commissariat of Education system [and] more than three hundred scholarly and editorial workers. In eight central Soviet institutions alone we kicked out more than two hundred nationalists and White Guardists who were heads of departments, heads of sectors, etc."⁵⁹

In 1933 alone, 100 percent of the directors of oblast directorates of public education were dismissed for political motives, and 90 percent of such directors in raion institutions. All of them were subjected to various types of repressions. Four thousand teachers, who were accused of being "class-enemy elements," were dismissed from schools throughout Ukraine, while the network of Russian schools and classes was concomitantly expanded. Out of 29 directors of pedagogical institutes of higher education, 18 were dismissed along with 210 lecturers.⁶⁰

These purges affected more than just the sphere of education. A new Ukrainian orthography was adopted in 1933, which, in contrast to its predecessor, brought the Ukrainian language closer to Russian. This move was accompanied by a hunt for "nationalists" in the Institute of Scholarly Language at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN). Not even the orthodox All-Ukrainian Association of Marxist-Leninist Institutes (VUAMLIN), which Skrypnyk had headed at one time, was spared. At a meeting of VUAMLIN's party organization held on 14 January 1934, Postyshev delivered a speech urging that all scholarly "fronts" (philosophical, economic, etc.) be "purged" of "Ukrainian national-fascism." This was the beginning of the purge, during which not a single sphere escaped the brutal struggle against "national deviationism" or "nationalism."

The People's Commissariat of Justice, the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house, the Chamber of Weights and Measures, film production studios, museums based in Ukraine's largest cities, the Kyivan Cave Monastery, libraries throughout the Ukrainian SSR—above all, the National Library of Ukraine—the Geodesic Directorate, the Karl Marx State Courses of Ukrainization, the D. I. Bahalii Institute of Ukrainian Culture, the T. H. Shevchenko Institute, the Institute of Soviet Law in Kharkiv, and many other institutions were totally purged.

Throughout 1933 newspapers were filled with articles viciously attacking the Institute of Philosophy, the VUAMLIN Institute of History, the Ukrainian Pedagogical Scholarly Research Institute, the All-Ukrainian Society "Marxist Pedagogue," and others. Even the "theatrical front" was affected by the purge: 200 "nationalistic works" and 20 "nationalistic translations"⁶¹ of world classics were placed under a production ban.⁶²

The first arrests of Ukrainian writers began in the early months of 1933. The pogrom against Ukrainian writers reached such a scale that on 17 May 1935 Kosior asked Balyts'kyi to "explain" to the organs under the latter's jurisdiction that all the arrests, house searches, and other types of repressions could not be carried out without the prior approval of CC CP(b)U secretaries. According to incomplete estimates, between December 1932 and May 1937 seventy-one Ukrainian writers were repressed.⁶³

The anti-Skrypnyk campaign thus evolved into a wide-scale persecution of Ukraine's intellectual forces. The results of the limited policy of Ukrainization, which had always been controlled by the Bolshevik government, were almost completely nullified.

THE PURGE OF THE PARTY

The events that were connected to the Famine of 1932–33 forced the Stalinist leadership to pay more diligent attention to the party and to the actions of its members while the famine had been raging. The Stalinists had not forgotten the fact that a certain (insignificant) number of party and state workers had sought to "soften" Moscow's policies in order to prevent the mass starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry. Party members had been punished for this back in 1932, and the next purge of party members was launched in 1933. This purge was not exclusive to the Ukrainian SSR, but it had specific traits in the republic. In 1933 a purge of the party took place in Kyiv, Donetsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts, and in the following year in the regions of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernihiv, as well as in the Moldavian ASSR (that is, the portions of Transnistria and adjoining regions of Ukraine that were made part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924). A temporary moratorium was placed on new party memberships. According to the data cited by Postyshev at the joint plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CP(b)U in November 1933, out of the 120,000 candidate-members who were caught up in the purge, 27,500 people—"class-enemies, irresolute elements, those who have crumbled"—were purged as of 15 October.⁶⁴

Fuller data on the course of the purges were cited in the speech delivered by CC CP(b)U secretary Kyrylo Sukhomlyn at the 12th Congress of the CP(b)U held in January 1934. "The immense practice of our work vividly confirmed Comrade Stalin's brilliant analysis, which he made at the January plenum of the CC and the CCC of the AUCP(b) with regard to the new forms and methods of hostile, sabotaging work 'on the quiet,' and this was particularly noticeable when we had dealings with insolent nationalistic elements. ...Of course, this complicated their exposure."⁶⁵

According to Sukhomlyn's figures, 267,907 people were caught up in the purges in Donetsk, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts; of these, 51,713 people

(19.3 percent) were expelled from the party.⁶⁶ The reasons for their expulsion were also listed: 23.1 percent were expelled because of “passive membership in the party,” 21 percent were expelled for “violations of party and state discipline,” while “hostile and class-foreign elements” comprised 18 percent of those expelled.⁶⁷

As Sukhomlyn noted in his speech at the 12th Party Congress, 39,017 out of 104,458 members of the CP(b)U were expelled over a period of two and a half years. Among those who were tried by the party, 17,150 individuals were described as “right opportunists, Trotskyites, ‘leftists,’ conciliationists, nationalists, and national deviationists.” A total of 6,323 people who were branded with these labels were expelled from the party.⁶⁸

Just as it had during the Holodomor, during the purge of the Ukrainian party ranks the Soviet regime once again resorted to political maneuvering. When the phenomenon known as “excesses”—that is, the all-out hunt for enemies and unsubstantiated expulsions from the party—began in the USSR, the Soviet leaders ascribed all these manifestations to various “concealed” enemies. In this connection, Sukhomlyn noted: “The course of the purge revealed that the class enemy and his intelligence agents—right opportunists, Trotskyites, nationalists—sought to diminish the significance and effectiveness of the purge, they tried to organize a sabotage of the purge, conspiracies of silence, etc.... It should also be kept in mind that the class enemy has tried and will continue to try and exploit the purge in order, on the one hand, to discredit true Bolsheviks and, on the other, to retain his agents within the party by all means.”⁶⁹

It goes without saying that these kinds of conclusions—and Sukhomlyn was not the only high-ranking party leader to make them—opened up the possibility for exacerbating the psychosis within the party and deepening the atmosphere of suspicion.

During the 12th Congress of the CP(b)U Postyshev delivered a political report. He began his speech with a description of the features of the class struggle and socialist construction in the period between the 16th and 17th Congress of the AUCP(b). He noted that “the Bolshevik offensive on the entire front was unfolding in the conditions of the class struggle, which is not weakening but, on the contrary, is continually intensifying under the conditions of the uninterrupted growth of resistance on the part of the remnants of the smashed class enemy.” Among the “acute moments in the class struggle” Postyshev mentioned the state grain delivery campaigns of 1931 and 1932, as well as the “wrecking” in industry and throughout the countryside.⁷⁰

Examining the worsening state of the 1932 state grain deliveries, Postyshev blamed this on the lower ranks of the party and soviet workers, declaring that their methods of managing “collective farm agriculture were practically the same as in independent farming.” He also blamed them for the increase in “wrecking.”⁷¹ Officially, Postyshev’s speech was a condemnation of the

repressive methods that were applied in the policies of collectivization and the state grain deliveries (these repressions were ascribed to “wreckers” and the “nationalistic counterrevolution”). In fact, it was oriented on the search for new enemies, on the need to portray even the slightest doubt concerning the utterly harsh administrative methods of managing Soviet agriculture as resistance mounted by class enemies.

Postyshev called the section in which he discussed nationality policy “the most serious part” of his speech. In its struggle to implement this policy the CP(b)U was supposed to “distinguish between two fundamental stages: the first stage—from the 11th Congress of the CP(b)U to the resolution of the CC AUCP(b) and the Sovnarkom of the USSR, dated 14 December, and the decision of the CC AUCP(b) of 24 January⁷²—and the second stage, the period after the adoption of these historic decisions.”⁷³ Postyshev was thus signaling that upon his arrival in Ukraine, the CP(b)U line in the sphere of national relations had acquired qualitatively new content.

Referring to the thesis advanced by Stalin at the 16th Congress of the AUCP(b) about the existence in the Soviet republics of “creeping” deviations in the national question, Postyshev emphasized that “with this instruction Comrade Stalin...was summoning the party to a struggle with these nationalist deviations—the agents of the class enemy.” Nevertheless, the CP(b)U had not reached any conclusions from this instruction, although “it had had several rather serious signals from the nationalist counterrevolution, which was becoming more active.”⁷⁴

THE OVERTURE TO THE “GREAT TERROR” (IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION)

The actual causes of the famine did not lie in the intensification of Ukrainian nationalism (including in the ranks of the CP[b]U) but in the policies that were implemented by the Stalinist leadership, beginning with collectivization. Now this leadership ordered the GPU to begin destroying those who were openly dissatisfied with these policies, sympathized with the peasants, or tried somehow to help them. As a rule, the Soviet security organs were well aware of this. At the same time, the GPU’s decisive and merciless actions were aimed at mobilizing those who were vacillating (both inside and outside the party) and at instituting harsher discipline. It is no accident that after the “purge” in the ranks of the CP(b)U, the largest proportion of those purged (38.4 percent) was comprised of communists whose party service record dated to 1931. The only members left unscathed were those who had joined the party before 1920 (8.2 percent).⁷⁵ Between 1933 and 1937 the number of ethnic Ukrainians in the CP(b)U shrank by 3.5 percent.⁷⁶

For the Stalinist regime, the Holodomor was an excellent lesson in the sense

that it was a “final solution” to the question of Ukrainian nationalism. It is no accident that the repressive impulse, which was aimed at those who were accused of nationalism, did not fade away in 1934–37. During the hunt for “concealed Trotskyites” familiar ethnic operations were put into operation that targeted the “remnants” of Ukrainian nationalists, who had to be found and punished.

The repressions that were connected to the Holodomor sparked a profound sense of tragedy in the hearts and minds of many Ukrainian intellectuals (naturally, those who still retained the capacity for independent thought). For example, Arkadii Liubchenko recalled that his fellow writer Khvyl’ovyi was profoundly disturbed by what he saw during his official visit to the Ukrainian countryside in the spring of 1933. Afterwards he declared: “The famine is a deliberately organized phenomenon. The famine and devastation are a cunning maneuver in order to deal with the very dangerous Ukrainian problem in one fell swoop.”⁷⁷

The dossier on Khvyl’ovyi—that is, the materials connected to his surveillance by the Soviet security organs—confirms that the scenes witnessed by this writer in Ukraine’s starving countryside exacerbated his already apocalyptic mood.⁷⁸ One informant reported the distinguished Ukrainian dramatist Mykola Kulish’s account of his conversation with Khvyl’ovyi, which took place one and a half months before the latter’s suicide.

I asked KHVYL’OVYI to explain how it was that when KHVYL’OVYI was still a “Khvyl’ovist” he was producing brilliant things, but now just “seeds.” KHVYL’OVYI replied: “I reconstructed myself logically, with reason, but emotionally—no, and I feel that I will not reconstruct myself soon. Emotionally, I am still my former self.” After his trip to the countryside, KHVYL’OVYI reminded me of this conversation, saying that now precisely that emotional part has taken possession of him above all else.⁷⁹

The word “emotional” refers to those horrific impressions that overwhelmed him when he saw entire Ukrainian villages totally depopulated by famine. There is no doubt that everything that Khvyl’ovyi witnessed in the countryside intensified his suicidal mood. On 26 May 1933, thirteen days after Khvyl’ovyi shot himself, the security service informant reporting on this tragedy commented: “Not only national aspects played a role in Khvyl’ovyi’s horrible fate but also sociopolitical ones—collectivization in Ukraine and its consequences.”⁸⁰

Khvyl’ovyi’s suicide was an unmistakable form of protest. Meanwhile, the Soviet regime did not even give the late writer’s colleagues, who understood the true causes of the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine, a chance to make this same kind of protest—the most terrible and final one. They were arrested and falsely

accused of belonging to such “counterrevolutionary organizations” as the “Union of Ukrainian Nationalists” (December 1934), the “Counterrevolutionary Organization of Former Borotbists” (1935), the “Anti-Soviet Nationalist Organization of Former Borotbists” (1937), and other fictitious groups. Each case entailed arrests. According to official data, 24,934 people were arrested in Ukraine in 1935; 15,717 in 1936; 159,573 in 1937; and 108,006 in 1938.⁸¹ These false charges resulted in a bullet to the back of the head or a condemnation, which usually ended with execution during the Yezhov purges.

In conclusion, it must be noted that the repressive activities of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in 1932–34 had multifactoral significance. First and foremost, they were aimed at crushing the Ukrainian peasantry’s potential and real resistance to the state grain delivery campaign. Second, one of the most significant aspects of the repressions was the participation of Soviet security organs in the requisitioning measures that took place in Ukraine’s rural regions. Finally, the security service, which was engaged in the systematic collection of information on individuals who objected to the regime’s harsh policies, also directed its efforts against those who had to be made to shoulder the blame for the government’s shortcomings—above all, the “nationalist counterrevolution.” Thus, the “operation in the countryside” gradually turned into an “operation” against the entire society of Ukraine, which was slated for total subjugation and then forced to remain silent about the true organizers of the Holodomor.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk

NOTES

1. Ruslan Ia. Pyrih et al., comps., *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (Kyiv, 1990).
2. Valentyna Borysenko et al., comps., *Rozsekrechena pam'iat': Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraïni v dokumentakh GPU-NKVD* (Kyiv, 2007).
3. Cited in D. Zlepko, ed. and comp., *Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins verschwiegener Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im Spiegel geheimgehaltener Akten des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes: eine Dokumentation* (Sonnenbühl, 1988), 54.
4. See O. V. Khlevniuk et al., comps., *Stalin i Kaganovich: perepiska 1931–1936 gg.* (Moscow, 2001), 274.
5. A. N. Iakovlev, ed., *Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD: Arkhiv Stalina: Dokumenty vysshnykh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi vlasti: Ianvar' 1922–dekabr' 1936 gg.* (Moscow, 2003), 340.
6. Ibid.

7. See A. A. Chernobaev, ed., *Na prieme u Stalina: tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.)* (Moscow, 2008), 79–80.
8. Pyrih et al., *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni*, 295.
9. Iu. I. Shapoval and V. A. Zolotar'ov, *Vsevolod Balyts'kyi: osoba, chas, otochennia* (Kyiv, 2002), 189.
10. Ibid.
11. State Branch Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny; hereafter HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 16, list 25 (year: 1951), file 3, fol. 73).
12. V. Nikol's'kyi, "Represyvna diial'nist' orhaniv GPU pid chas holodomoru v USRR (1932–1933 rr.)," *Z arkhiviv VUCHK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, no. 2 (2001): 484.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 480.
15. Cited in Shapoval and Zolotar'ov, *Vsevolod Balyts'kyi*, 189.
16. Ibid., 190.
17. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 42, file 9, fols. 83–86.
18. Cited in V. Vasyl'iev, "Tsina holodnoho khliba," in *Komandyry velykoho holodu: poïzdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukraïnu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932–1933 rr.*, ed. Valerii Vasyl'iev and Iurii Shapoval (Kyiv, 2001), 54–55.
19. Ibid., 55.
20. Iu. Shapoval, "III konferentsiia KP(b)U: proloh trahedii holodu," in *Komandyry velykoho holodu*, 162.
21. Shapoval and Zolotar'ov, *Vsevolod Balyts'kyi*, 193.
22. Pyrih et al., *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni*, 371–72.
23. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 1, file 281, fol. 194.
24. Cited in *Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust*, 229.
25. See Vladimir N. Khaustov, "Razvitie sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: 1917–1953 gg.," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 42, nos. 2–4 (2001): 366.
26. Ibid., 367.
27. Pyrih et al., *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni*, 349.
28. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 6, file 237, fol. 145; *ibid.*, file 281, fol. 201.
29. Archive of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Kharkiv Oblast (Arkhiv Upravlinnia vnutrishnikh sprav Kharkivs'koï oblasti), fond 48, list 1, file 1, vol. 3, fols. 3–4.
30. Iu. Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-kh rokiv: storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kyiv, 1993), 106–7.
31. O. V. Khlevniuk et al., comps., *Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gody: sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow, 1995), 63.
32. HDA SBU, Odesa, file 25468, vol. 1, fol. 48.
33. V. Vasyl'iev, "30-e gody na Ukraine," *Kommunist*, no. 17 (1990): 78.
34. Shapoval and Zolotar'ov, *Vsevolod Balyts'kyi*, 227.
35. HDA SBU, Kyiv, Collection of Published Works, file 668, fol. 221v.

36. Pyrih et al., *Holod 1932–1933 na Ukraïni*, 443.
37. Ibid., 441.
38. V. Danilov, R. Manning, L. Viola, eds., *Tragediia sovetskoï derevni: kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, vol. 3, *Konets 1930–1933* (Moscow, 2001), 634–35; TsDAHO, fond 1, list 16, file 9, fols. 115–16.
39. Gerhard Simon, “Die Große Hungersnot in der Ukraine: Holodomor als Völkermord: Tatsachen und Kontroversen,” *Europäische Rundschau*, no. 1 (2008): 89.
40. Pyrih et al., *Holod 1932–1933 na Ukraïni*, 291–94.
41. Shapoval and Zolotar’ov, *Vsevolod Balyts’kyi*, 205.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 207.
44. Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-kh rokiv*, 132.
45. Nikol’s’kyi, “Represyvna diial’nist’ orhaniv GPU,” 490.
46. *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraïni: Za dokumentamy HDA SBU; Anotovanyi dovidnyk* (Lviv, 2010), 319.
47. Borysenko et al., *Rozsekrechena pam’iat’*, 538.
48. O. Mozokhin and T. Gladkov, *Menzhinskii: Intelligent s Lubianki* (Moscow, 2005), 432; O. Mozokhin, *Pravo na repressii: Vnesudebnye polnomochiia gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (1918–1953)* (Moscow-Zhukovskii, 2006), 312.
49. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 65, file S-4468, vol. 1, fol. 6.
50. Ibid., fol. 66.
51. A. Khvyliia, “Vykorinyty, znyshchyty natsionalistychne korinnia na movnomu fronti,” *Bil’shovyk Ukraïny*, nos. 7–8 (1933): 55.
52. Ibid.
53. “Narada z pytan’ natsional’noi polityky partii,” *Visti VUTsK*, 1 May 1933.
54. Ibid.
55. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 1, file 413, fol. 34.
56. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 6, file 284, fol. 34.
57. “Volodymyr Vynnychenko pro samohubstvo M. Khvyl’ovoho i M. Skrypnyka: z neopublikovanykh zapysok V. Vynnychenka ‘Dumky pro sebe na tim sviiti,’” *Suchasnist’*, no. 9 (1971): 14.
58. “Pidsumky i naiblyzhchi zavdannia provedennia natsional’noi polityky na Ukraïni. Rezoliutsiia ob’iednanoho Plenumu TsK i TsKK KP(b)U na dopovid’ tov. S. V. Kosiora, ukhvalena 22 lystopada 1933 r.,” *Chervonyi shliakh*, nos. 8–9 (1933): 267–68.
59. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 1, file 420, fols. 141–42.
60. H. V. Kas’ianov and V. M. Danylenko, *Stalinizm i ukrains’ka intelihentsiia (20–30-i roky)* (Kyiv, 1991), 83–85.
61. There is no logical explanation for the absurd term “nationalistic translation.” Most likely it means that translators had used the “Skrypnyk orthography.”
62. Kas’ianov and Danylenko, *Stalinizm i ukrains’ka intelihentsiia*, 86.

63. This figure is cited in Oleksa Musiienko, comp., and Valerii Huzhva, ed., *Z poroha smerti: pys'mennyky Ukraïny—zhertvy stalins'kykh represii* (Kyiv, 1991).
64. TsDAHO, fond 1, list 1, file 422, fol. 13.
65. *XII z'ïzd KP(b)U, 18–23 sichnia 1934 r.: stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kharkiv, 1934), 231.
66. *Ibid.*, 238.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*, 230.
69. *Ibid.*, 240.
70. *Ibid.*, 153.
71. *Ibid.*, 184.
72. 1932 and 1933, respectively.
73. *XII z'ïzd KP(b)U, 18–23 sichnia 1934 r.*, 201.
74. *Ibid.*
75. See Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-kh rokiv*, 157.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Cited in A. Liubchenko, *Vybrani tvory* (Kyiv, 1999), 423.
78. For additional details, see Iu. Shapoval, comp., *Poliuvannia na "Val'dshnepa": roz-sekrechenyi Mykola Khvyl'ovyi: naukovo-dokumental'ne vydannia* (Kyiv, 2009).
79. HDA SBU, Kyiv, file S-183, fol. 115.
80. *Ibid.*, fol. 129.
81. See A. Iakovlev, *Po moshcham i elei* (Moscow, 1995), 180.